Saturday, August 10, 2013

Big Changes possibly coming for Bloomington Illinois Divorces

Divorces in McLean County are governed, in large part, by the IMDMA (Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act). There have been plans on the drawing board to revise the IMDMA for some time, but a vote may come this Fall to make some major changes. I will be publishing a number of blog posts on McLeanCountyDivorce.blogspot.com over the next couple of months about these changes that could affect my divorce practice in Bloomington Illinois. This first post is simply an article that I was sent by the State Bar. If you have any questions about these changes and how they will affect your Central Illinois divorce or family case, just contact my office at Office@BloomingtonLawGroup.com 


Terminology. Courts will no longer award custody or visitation under this bill. Rather, courts will allocate parental responsibilities to include parenting time. A parent may ask the court for permission to relocate with a minor child instead of removing the child. Interestingly, it continues to use the lawyerism dissolution of marriage. Have any of you ever heard this process referred to as anything other than a divorce?

Grounds. House Bill 1452 includes only one ground for dissolution—that irreconcilable differences have caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, and that efforts at reconciliation have failed or that future attempts at reconciliation would be impracticable and not in the best interests of the family.[1] The current six-month waiting period for this ground is repealed, but if the parties are separated for six months it creates an irrefutable presumption that irreconcilable differences exist.[2]

Presumption of residential parenting time. House Bill 1452 creates a rebuttable presumption in every case that it is in the best interest of a child that each parent should be allocated not less than 35% residential parenting time.[3] A court does have authority to restrict parental responsibilities to protect a child's mental, moral, or physical, or emotional health.[4]

Allocation of parental responsibilities. House Bill 1452 requires the court to presume that it is in the child's best interests to allocate significant decision-making responsibilities to each parent if each parent had been exercising significant decision-making responsibilities for the child (1) over the prior 24 months preceding the filing of the petition or (2) since the child's birth if the child is under the age of two.[5]

Parenting Plan. All parents, within 90 days after service or filing of a petition for allocation of parental responsibilities, must file with the court a separate or joint proposed parenting plan supported by an affidavit or affidavits.[6]If the court doesn't approve a joint parenting plan, it must make express findings justifying its refusal to do so. If the parties can't agree on a joint plan, they must submit separate plans. A rebuttable presumption is created that the child's best interests are served by awarding a time-sharing arrangement consisting of an allocation of not less than 35% residential time for each parent. A parenting plan must contain at a minimum information meeting 14 statutory criteria.[7] If the court is forced to choose between the separate parenting plans, it must select the plan that maximizes the child's relationship and access to both parents. The court retains discretion to determine exceptions to this directive if warranted by individual facts and circumstances but must provide written findings of fact and conclusions of law when making such exceptions.[8]

Delays in judgments. House Bill 1452 makes two changes for how judgments are handled. (1) Requires the court to enter a judgment at the conclusion of the case. It prohibits it from being entered after hearing the testimony on the grounds only.[9] (2) Requires the court to enter a judgment of dissolution of marriage within 60 days of the closing of proofs unless the court enters an order specifying good cause that gives it an additional 30 days.[10]

Child support. The only change made here is substitution of the term supporting parent fornon-custodial parent. The supporting parent is the parent with the majority of residential responsibility of the child.[11]

Joint petition for simplified dissolution. It changes the criteria for filing a joint petition for simplified dissolution as follows:[12]

  • Neither party may have an interest in "retirement benefits."
  • The total FMV of all marital property, after deduction of encumbrances, is less than $50k.
  • The combined gross annualized income from all sources is less than $60k.
  • Neither party has a gross annualized income from all sources in excess of $30k.

Marital settlement agreements. A § 502 marital settlement agreement, which may include educational expenses, must be in writing or it's not valid.[13] The terms of an agreement incorporated into a judgment trump any conflict between its terms and prove-up testimony.[14] Concerning modification of an agreement, property provisions are never modifiable; child support, parental responsibilities, maintenance, and educational expenses are modifiable on a substantial change of circumstances. The parties may agree that maintenance is non-modifiable in amount, duration, or both.[15]

Property. Among the many changes made to § 503 on division of property and debts, two will be noted here. (1) Requires the party alleging that something isn't marital property to prove it by clear and convincing evidence.[16] (2) If the court doesn't divide the property on a 50% basis, it must make specific findings of fact as why it deviated from that directive.[17]

Maintenance. Among the many changes to § 504 on maintenance, three will be noted here. (1) If House Bill 1452 is enacted, an order for unallocated maintenance and child support may not be entered.[18] This doesn't affect previously entered unallocated orders. (2) The court may secure a maintenance award by requiring the payor to buy an appropriate amount of life insurance and name the recipient spouse as the beneficiary.[19] (3) If the court changes an order of maintenance, House Bill 1452 requires the court to make a record of the specific factual findings that support this change.[20]

Educational expenses. Among § 513's changes are the following:

  • Educational expenses under this Section must be incurred no later than the student's 23rd birthday unless otherwise agreed to by the parties.
  • Caps the expenses for tuition, fees, housing, and meals to what is charged at the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana. This cap doesn't include other expenses such as medical expenses and other reasonable living expenses.
  • Support under this Section ends when the student fails to maintain a "C" average (unless illness or otherwise extenuating circumstances), becomes 23 years of age or older, receives a bachelor's degree, or marries. It doesn't terminate the court's authority under this Section if the child joins the military, becomes pregnant, or is incarcerated.
  • Children are not third-party beneficiaries and not entitled to file a petition for contribution.
  • Relief under § 513 is retroactive to the date of filing of the petition.

Non-minor disabled child. A new section (§ 513.5) is created for the support of a non-minor disabled child. The definition of disabled is borrowed from the Americans with Disabilities Act. Unless an application is made for § 513 support for a disabled child, the disability must have arisen before the child attained majority.

Modification. The general rule is that a court is required to modify a parenting plan or allocation judgment if necessary to serve the child's best interests if the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence:

  • a substantial change of circumstances has occurred with the child or of any parent caused by facts that have arisen since the entry of the existing parenting plan or allocation judgment or were not anticipated in the plan or judgment; or
  • the existing allocation of parental responsibilities seriously endangers the child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.[21]

The court may modify a parenting plan or allocation judgment without a showing of changed circumstances if it is in the child's best interests and any of the following circumstances occur:

  • The modification is minor.
  • The modification reflects the actual arrangement under which the child has been living (without parental objection) for the six months preceding the filing of the petition for modification.
  • The modification is necessary to modify an agreed parenting plan or allocation judgment that the court would not have approved or ordered if the court had been aware of the circumstances at the time of the order or approval.

Relocation. Relocation is a substantial change of circumstances for modifying a judgment.[22] Relocation is defined as "a change of residence of more than 25 miles for more than 90 days that significantly impairs a parent's ability to exercise the parental responsibilities that the parent has been exercising or is entitled to exercise under a parenting plan or allocation judgment."[23] Only a parent who has been allocated a majority parenting time may seek to relocate with a child, except that when parents have equal parenting time, either parent may seek to relocate with a child. House Bill 1452 provides a procedure for notice and objection of intent to relocate.

Effective date. House Bill 1452 has no stated effective date; therefore, if it is passed in veto session, it probably will become law on June 1, 2014. It would then apply to these proceedings commenced on or after July 1, 2014: new proceedings, all pending actions, and all proceedings in which modification is sought of a judgment or order entered before July 1, 2014.[24]





Jon D. McLaughlin
Bloomington Law Group LLC
Flanagan State Bank Building
2401 East Washington Street
Bloomington Illinois 61704
Skype: jmclaug2



Wednesday, August 7, 2013

Something for Sperm Donors in Bloomington Illinois to Keep on the Radar

Kansas demands that sperm donor pay child support

By NBC staff and wire services
August 7, 2013, 7:25 pm
NBCNews.com

A Kansas man who donated sperm to a lesbian couple three years ago is fighting the state's demand that he pay child support.

The two women raising the 3-year-old girl say they support the man, who responded to an ad they posted on the Craigslist website in 2009, the Topeka Capital-Journal reported.

The issue of child support arose when the two women broke up, and the couple applied for state services. Workers at the Kansas Department for Children and Families demanded the donor's name and then filed a child-support claim against him, the newspaper said.

Angela Bauer, one of the mothers, told the Capital-Journal that she and her former partner, Jennifer Schreiner, support the donor, William Marotta, "in whatever action he wants to go forward with" to fight the state's demand.

"This was a wonderful opportunity with a guy with an admirable, giving character who wanted nothing more than to help us have a child," the newspaper quoted Bauer, 40, as saying. "I feel like the state of Kansas has made a mess out of the situation."

When Bauer and Schreiner, the 34-year-old birth mother, reached a deal with Marotta that did not include any payment for his sperm donation, he signed a written agreement that relinquished all parental rights and held him harmless "for any child support payments demanded of him by any other person or entity, public or private ... regardless of the circumstances or said demand," it said.

The state argued in court papers that because the insemination wasn't performed by a licensed physician, the contract was null and void.

When the two women split in 2010, they had eight children, including some they adopted, whom they now co-parent.

Marotta, a 43-year-old mechanic, was dragged into the dispute when the couple filed for state assistance. The state insisted that they reveal the donor's identity, saying that if they refused to do so, their daughter would no longer be eligible for health care coverage. The women reluctantly complied, the Capital-Journal reported.

The girl's birth certificate does not include her biological father's name, and the Capital-Journal said that he had no contact with the girl, other than receiving occasional email updates from Bauer. Both women adopted the girl, although they had to file for adoption separately because the state does not recognize same-sex unions, the newspaper said. This means that the state also cannot collect child support from same-sex parents.

"More and more gays and lesbians are adopting and reproducing, and this, to me, is a step backward," said Bauer, who formerly supported the family financially but is no longer able to work due to a "serious illness." "I think a lot of progressive movement is happening currently in the world as far as gays and

Page 1 of 3 Aug 07, 2013 08:26:16PM MDT

http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/12/30/16254404-kansas-demands-that-sperm-donor-pay-child-support?lite

lesbians go. Maybe this is Kansas' stand against some of that."

The Capital-Journal could not reach Marotta for comment and the Kansas Department for Children and Families declined to discuss the case, citing privacy laws.

This isn't the first time states have demanded child support from sperm donors. But in most of those cases, the sperm donor was known to the birth family – usually a man who was friendly with a lesbian couple and who agreed to help them out.

Court rulings vary

Sperm donors who donate through a sperm bank are typically protected by state parenting shield laws. But in less straight-forward cases, courts have differed on whether the men should pay up.

A Massachusetts court ruled this year that a Nigerian immigrant had to pay child support for twins conceived through artificial insemination a year after he and his wife had separated, the Patriot Ledger reported.

And In Vermont, a man who donated sperm to a female friend was required to pay child support because he maintained a relationship with the children.

Explained one of the mothers to The Associated Press in 2007: "Part of the decision came down because he was so involved with them. It wasn't that he went to the (sperm) bank and that was it. They called him Papa."

In New York, a married doctor agreed to donate sperm to a young resident and her partner in the late 1980s, only to be asked 18 years later for child support, the New York Post reported.

His undoing was sending money and cards to the child, which he would sign, "Dad" or "Daddy." The biological father's name was also on the birth certificate.

But in Washington state, the Court of Appeals ruled in 2004 that a donor can't be required to pay child support unless he and the mother have signed an explicit contract.

And in Texas, an appeals court ruled in favor of a former policeman who donated sperm to a woman he had been formerly connected with. He had paid thousands of dollars in child support for twins until the court ruled in his favor.

When the lawsuit was filed in 2008, the man told McClatchy: "I was totally blown away. I was already married and had moved on with my life."

NBC's Isolde Raftery and The Associated Press contributed reporting.





Best Regards, 

Jon D. McLaughlin
Bloomington Law Group LLC
Flanagan State Bank Building
2401 East Washington Street
Bloomington Illinois 61704
Skype: jmclaug2


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Friday, July 26, 2013

Take your dog anywhere in Bloomington Illinois

Here is a fun one... It turns out that it does not take much for a dog to be considered a service dog, and then you can take Fido almost anywhere you want to. 

The two issues are if you are considered as disabled under the ADA, and if your pet is a service animal. 


As for the service animal designation, there is no certification or license  Rather, your animal just needs to "trained to provide assistance to an individual with a disability," so one dog class that trains your dog to help you with your disability would could.  

I think you get the idea as to how easy it would be to treat your dog or cat as a service animal. Once your dog is a service animal, then the protections of the ADA kick in, and people can't even question you about your animal. 

For more information, you can go here: http://www.ada.gov/qasrvc.htm


Best Regards, 

Jon D. McLaughlin
Bloomington Law Group LLC

Flanagan State Bank Building
2401 East Washington Street
Bloomington Illinois 61704
Skype: jmclaug2
Office: (309) 319-6206


Thursday, July 25, 2013

Ex-Spouses and Surviving Spouses

When folks divorce in Bloomington Illinois, ERISA-governed retirement benifits are divided by way of QDRO's or QILDRO's. The non-participant spouse often argues to by included as a surviving spouse in the QDRO or QILDRO. Here is a case that may now be applicable in your Bloomington Illinois Divorce:

Dissolution of Marriage 1st Dist.
In re Marriage of Winter, 2013 IL App (1st) 112836 (July 12, 2013) Cook Co., 6th Div. (REYES) Affirmed.
Husband, a retired public school teacher, began receiving pension payments in 1985. Judgment of dissolution in 2005 awarded entire marital portion of pension to wife via QILDRO. Court properly found that wife failed to meet definition of a surviving spouse under Pension Code, and thus surviving spouse benefit is not subject to division as marital property. Pension Code restricts receipt of benefit only to a surviving spouse. Thus, survivor benefits belonged to neither husband nor wife, but to hypothetical and undetermined "surviving spouse" defined by Pension Code, and thus, survivor benefits are not marital property as defined by Marriage Act. (LAMPKIN and GORDON, concurring.)



Best Regards, 

Jon D. McLaughlin
Bloomington Law Group LLC
Flanagan State Bank Building
2401 East Washington Street
Bloomington Illinois 61704
Skype: jmclaug2


Thursday, July 18, 2013

Custody-Guardianship Appeal Opinion: In re A.M., 2013 IL App (3d) 120809

The attorneys at Bloomington Law Group LLC are well-versed in family law issues, including custody and guardianship law. Attorney Michelle N. Schneiderheinze made the firm proud, once again, with her work in the case of In re A.M., 2013 IL App (3d) 120809.


Holding:

In proceedings arising from the adoption of three children by their maternal grandmother after the termination of their biological mother's parental rights, the trial court's grant of the guardianship petition filed by the children's maternal aunt was reversed on the ground that the order was void ab initio, since the trial court entered the order without first considering the parental fitness of the maternal grandmother, there was no evidence supporting a finding that the grandmother was unable or unwilling to parent the children, and jurisdiction to hear a guardianship petition exists only after a determination that a parent is unfit. 





Bloomington Law Group LLC
Flanagan State Bank Building
2401 East Washington Street
Bloomington Illinois 61704
Office: (309) 319-6206



Friday, July 12, 2013

Father's Rights: Very Interesting Case for Father in Bloomington IL



Fathers in McLean County often are faced with accusations that are frustrating to deal with. This recent case gives Fathers some insight as to how to combat false or misleading accusations.

In re Marriage of Agers

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Citation
Case Number: 
 2013 IL App (5th) 120375
Decision Date: 
 July 8, 2013
District: 
 5th Dist.
Division/County: 
 Pulaski Co.
Justice: 
 GOLDENHERSH
Holding: 
 Affirmed.
Uncorroborated hearsay statements of five-year-old minor alone were insufficient to support a finding of abuse. Sufficient corroboration of alleged abuse or neglect requires more than just witnesses testifying that minor told them of abuse. Minor's mother failed to present sufficient evidence to show that father's visitation would seriously endanger minor. Court properly admitted videotape of minor and her father during visitation at courthouse, as court found tape relevant only for limited purpose of showing that minor did not fear her father, and to observe their interaction. Court properly denied mother's motion for in camera interview with minor, as mother could have presented minor's testimony during hearing but chose not to do so, and trial court has great discretion as to whether to conduct in camera interviews with minors. (WELCH and CATES, concurring.)


Best Regards, 

Jon D. McLaughlin
Bloomington Law Group LLC
Flanagan State Bank Building
2401 East Washington Street
Bloomington Illinois 61704
Skype: jmclaug2
Office: (309) 319-6206



Saturday, July 6, 2013

Bloomington Law Group LLC

Our Firm

Bloomington Law Group LLC

Attorneys Michelle Schneiderheinze and Jon D. McLaughlin

 

We first worked together in the chambers of Federal Judge Joe McDade in 2005. Since that time, we have taken paths that have led through several law firms and even a few States. In December 2010, Attorney Schneiderheinze opened her own law firm in Bloomington Illinois, focusing on legal issues relating to consumer debt relief (including bankruptcy), divorce, child custody, and special education. In July 2013, we decided to form the firm of Bloomington Law Group LLC. We wanted to offer our clients better service and more reasonable rates. There are many ideas and experiences that each of us have brought to this firm, and we strive to provide the best legal representation in the Central Illinois Area. We work closely with our clients, and we treat each client like family. Bloomington/Normal is a small enough area that we practically are all family. We also feel that there are creative payment options that we can offer to our clients that will enable them to hire our firm without spending their last dime. It is important to us that our clients feel that our firm is working for their best interests and not simply trying to make a buck off of them.

 

Our firm handles a variety of civil and criminal legal issues. Predominantly, our firm deals with Divorce and other Family Law Matters, Bankruptcy, Special Education, Estate Planning, and Civil Litigation. If you have any questions for us, please call our bloomington office in order to schedule a free consultation. 




Jon D. McLaughlin
Bloomington Law Group LLC
Flanagan State Bank Building
2401 East Washington Street
Bloomington Illinois 61704
Skype: jmclaug2



Friday, June 28, 2013

A recent Maintenance Case that may prove helpful in your Bloomington Illinois DIvorce

In re Marriage of Dowd

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Citation
Case Number: 
 2013 IL App (3d) 120140
Decision Date: 
 June 20, 2013
District: 
 3d Dist.
Division/County: 
 Will Co.
Justice: 
 WRIGHT
Holding: 
 Affirmed.
Court properly awarded wife 20% of husband's bonuses between $50,001 and $100,000 per year, and zero of husband's bonuses exceeding $100,000 each year in maintenance award (with monthly maintenance to wife of $6,100). Court's decision to allow fixed maintenance plus graduated percentage of annual bonuses as incentive for husband to maintain his productivity was reasonable and fair. Court properly denied wife's petition for contribution to attorney fees, as wife received property and accounts in excess of $200,000, and thus had sufficient income and assets to pay her own attorney fees. (McDADE and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

--
Jon D. McLaughlin
(309) 319-6206 


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If you have a Child Support Case in McLean County, this recent case may be relevant


In re Marriage of Carlson-Urbanczyk

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Citation
Case Number: 
 2013 IL App (3d) 120731
Decision Date: 
 June 26, 2013
District: 
 3rd Dist.
Division/County: 
 Will Co.
Justice: 
 WRIGHT
Holding: 
 Affirmed.
Court granted mother sole custody of three minor children, and ordered father to pay child support in statutory amount of 32% of his net income. Court properly ordered father to pay 20% of children's daycare and extracurricular activities, rather than the 40% of those expenses originally ordered, as that would have reduced father's net income by 50% (total child support plus expenses). Any amount above agreed 32% of father's net income represents upward deviation from statutory amount and must be supported by record. Court properly found that father did not have ability to pay 40% of those expenses. (CARTER and McDADE, concurring.)

--
Jon D. McLaughlin
(309) 319-6206 


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Friday, May 31, 2013

An interesting Father's Rights case for Bloomington Fathers (4th District)


In re the Parentage of J.W.
Illinois Supreme Court
Civil Court
Citation
Case Number:  2013 IL 114817
Decision Date:  May 23, 2013
District:  4th Dist.
Division/County:  Vermilion Co.
Justice:  THEIS
Holding:  Circuit court affirmed; appellate court reversed.

Biological father of 11-year-old girl, conceived in one-time sexual encounter but whose parentage had been presumed to be of mother's first husband, legally established his parentage. In proceeding to determine visitation privileges under Section 14(a)(1) of Parentage Act, initial burden is on the noncustodial parent to show visitation is in the best interests of the child, using best-interest standard of Section 602 of Marriage Act. Court's ruling that any presumption that it was in child's best interests to promote parent-child relationship was rebutted by evidence, considering child's actions and behavior and concern of expert and GAL for increased risk of harm to child at this stage in her concrete cognitive development if visitation with biological father were awarded. 

(KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, KARMEIER, and BURKE, concurring.)

--
Jon D. McLaughlin
(309) 319-6206 


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Friday, May 24, 2013

Child Support Case that May Affect Your Bloomington Illinois Case

In re Marriage of Mayfield

Illinois Supreme Court
Civil Court
Citation
Case Number: 
 2013 IL 114655
Decision Date: 
 May 23, 2013
District: 
 4th Dist.
Division/County: 
 Woodford Co.
Justice: 
 THEIS
Holding: 
 Appellate court affirmed.
Ex-husband received lump-sum settlement for workers compensation claim. Court must justify any departure from child support guidelines when allocating a lump sum. A one-time payment such as lump-sum settlement is income, but its nonrecurring nature may factor into court's decision on allocation. Ex-husband presented insufficient evidence to warrant deviation under Section 505(a)(2), and never speicifically asked court to depart from guidelines. Court properly set child support at 20% of lump-sum settlement, in absence of any evidence to support a different amount. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, KARMEIER, and BURKE, concurring.)

--
Jon D. McLaughlin
(309) 319-6206 


THIS MESSAGE AND ANY ATTACHMENTS MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL, PRIVILEGED, AND EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. ANY RECIPIENT OTHER THAN THE INTENDED RECIPIENT IS ADVISED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION, COPYING, OR OTHER USE OF THIS MESSAGE IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.

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Wednesday, May 22, 2013

Case Law Update: Cases that may affect your Bloomington Illinois Divorce or Child Custody Case

Contribution to Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to 503(j) Upheld.

In In re Marriage of Sobieski, 2013 IL App (2d) 111146, 984 N.E.2d 163, 368 Ill.Dec. 438, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to order the husband to pay $43,180 towards wife's outstanding attorneys' fees. One of the main issues at trial was the proper calculation of husband's net income. The court agreed with the finding that his net monthly income was $12,000 given his lack of credible testimony. The husband admitted that he handled significant amounts of cash in his employment at a family-owned business. He had also filled out various financial applications that contradicted his own testimony about his income. On the other hand, the wife suffered from bipolar disorder and depression and had a significantly lower earning capacity than the husband. Although the husband argued that he and the wife were in similar financial situations after the divorce, the appellate court held that the trial court properly considered all of the statutory factors when ordering the contribution.

Guideline Child Support Appropriate even when Father Spends Substantial Amount of Time with the Children.

In In re Marriage of Sobieski, 2013 IL App (2d) 111146, 984 N.E.2d 163, 368 Ill.Dec. 438, the father appealed a trial court's ruling that he pay guideline child support even though he spent portions of 216 days per year with the children. In the parenting agreement, the mother was designated the four children's primary residential parent. The trial court was not persuaded that she should not be entitled to guideline support. The court relied on the case of In re Marriage of Demattia, 302 Ill.App.3d 390, 706 N.E.2d 67, 235 Ill.Dec. 807 (1999), which held that there should not be an automatic reduction in child support because the father spends extended time with his children, who reside primarily with the mother.

Appellate Court Had Jurisdiction To Hear Postjudgment Appeal Filed 30 Days After Trial Court's Initial Ruling.

In a postjudgment action in In re Marriage of Putzler,2013 IL App (2d) 120551, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, the mother filed a petition to increase support and two different petitions for rule to show cause relating to parenting issues. The trial court ruled on the petition to increase support first, but did not issue any S.Ct. Rule 304(a) language in the order. The father waited to file his notice of appeal on the child-support issue after all of the pending postjudgment petitions were ruled on. The appellate court held that it did have jurisdiction to consider the appeal on the support issue even though more than 30 days had passed since the court's ruling because he timely filed his notice of appeal after all pending claims were resolved at the trial level.

Postjudgment Increase in Child Support Upheld.

In In re the Marriage of Putzler,2013 IL App (2d) 120551, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling to increase a father's support order from $2,500 to $3,703 per month. The father argued at trial that the mother had failed to demonstrate that expenses for the children had specifically increased. The mother hired a certified public accountant to review the father's tax returns and opine at trial on the father's income. The father failed to offer any contradictory evidence to this opinion. The appellate court reaffirmed existing caselaw, which states regardless of whether the children's needs have increased support obligations may be increased based upon an increase in the supporting parent's ability to pay. Additionally, it is well settled that an increase in the children's needs may be presumed because they have grown older and the cost of living has risen. The appellate court also upheld a fee award to the mother for prevailing on two petitions for rule on parenting issues even though she was employed at a law firm and her boss had agreed to not charge her for her representation.

Illinois Trial Court Has Authority To Hear Subsequent Removal Petitions as Part of Its Inherent Power To Enforce Custody and Visitation Provisions in Its Judgment.

InBanister v. Partridge, 2013 IL App (4th) 120916, 984 N.E.2d 598, 368 Ill.Dec. 652, a parentage action, the mother petitioned for leave to remove the minor child to Kentucky so that she could reside with her new husband who was in the military and residing at Fort Campbell. The trial court made numerous findings under the Eckert factors (see In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill.2d 316, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 116 Ill.Dec. 220 (1988)) and ruled that it was in the child's best interests to reside in Kentucky. Later, the mother filed a petition to remove the child from Kentucky to Maine, where her husband had been assigned to a ROTC training position. The trial court denied her petition and she appealed. On appeal, the mother argued that the trial court lacked statutory authority to hear her petition on the grounds that once leave is given to a parent to remove a child from Illinois, neither the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (IMDMA), 750 ILCS 5/101, et seq., or the Illinois Parentage Act, 750 ILCS 40/1, et seq., require the parent seek further leave of court to remove the child again. The court disagreed and held that by its inherent authority to enforce its custody and visitation provisions of its judgment, it had the authority to hear the subsequent removal issue. However, the appellate court reversed the trial court on the removal issue and found that the child's life would be enhanced if the mother was allowed to remove him to Maine.


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Jon D. McLaughlin
(309) 319-6206 


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Saturday, May 18, 2013

Possible First Refusal Bill that could Affect Bloomington Illinois Visitation Orders

The issue of First-Refusal Rights often come up in Bloomington Illinois divorces. I thought this was interesting:

Family law and visitation
House Bill 2992
(Harms, R-Watseka; Silverstein, D-Chicago) allows a court to consider, consistent with the best interest of the child, whether to award to one or both of the parties the "right of first refusal" to provide child care for the minor child or children during the other parent's normal parenting time. Although the parties may agree to a right of first refusal, if they do not, and the court determines that a right of first refusal is in the best interest of the child, the court shall consider new statutory criteria and make provisions for it consistent with the best interest of the child. It doesn't affect use of a substitute child-care provider for emergency situations and applies only if a party intends to leave the minor child or children with a substitute child-care provider for a significant period of time. Passed the House and on second reading in the Senate. 
Want to comment on this bill?

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Jon D. McLaughlin
(309) 319-6206 


THIS MESSAGE AND ANY ATTACHMENTS MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL, PRIVILEGED, AND EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. ANY RECIPIENT OTHER THAN THE INTENDED RECIPIENT IS ADVISED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION, COPYING, OR OTHER USE OF THIS MESSAGE IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.

IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS MESSAGE IN ERROR, PLEASE NOTIFY THE SENDER IMMEDIATELY.

IRS CIRCULAR 230 NOTICE: To the extent that this message or any attachment concerns tax matters, it is not intended to be used and cannot be used by a taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties that may be imposed by law.

Wednesday, May 1, 2013

Marital Obligations in Bankruptcy Clarified Spouse’s Duty to Pay Opponent’s Attorney Fees May Be Held Non-Dischargeable in Bankruptcy

From Rebecca L. Reinhardt

Attorney fees ordered to be paid by one spouse on behalf of the other are non-dischargeable in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings, a bankruptcy judge in Central Illinois held recently.

In Johnson v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 2012 WL 2835462 (Bankr. C.D.Ill. 2012), the marital settlement agreement obligated the husband to pay the fees to the wife's divorce attorney, but the husband filed for bankruptcy before doing so.  Seeking to avoid the bankruptcy discharge, the wife's attorney argued to the bankruptcy court that the fees, though payable to him, were in the nature of a domestic support obligation and thus non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), and the bankruptcy court agreed.

The Bankruptcy Code actually has two provisions relevant to the treatment of marital obligations in bankruptcy: § 523(a)(5), excepting from discharge debts "for a domestic support allegation," and 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15), covering debts "to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor and not of the kind described in [§ 523(a)(5)] that is incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order" of a court or governmental unit.

In Johnson, the court said that after the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention & Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (119 Stat. 186) ("BAPCPA"), the distinction between domestic support obligations (§ 523(a)(5)) and other types of obligations arising out of the ending of a marital relationship (§ 523(a)(15)) is of no practical consequence in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy: neither is dischargeable in Chapter 7.  The court went on to state that it was of no consequence that the obligation was owed to the wife's attorney and not to the wife directly.  While 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) defines "domestic support obligation" as used in § 523(a)(5) as a debt "owed to or recoverable by" the spouse or child, courts have not interpreted the statute literally, looking instead to the nature of the debt and not to whom the debt is owed. Johnson followed that trend.

Chapter 13 Different:  However, there is a significant distinction between the dischargeability of debts arising from a divorce or separation in a Chapter 7 and a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding.

In Chapter 13, to obtain confirmation, plans must provide for payment in full of claims entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. § 507.  11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2).  "Domestic support obligations" are entitled to such priority.  § 507(a)(1)(A).  Further, "domestic support obligations" are excepted from the general discharge granted to debtors upon completion of Chapter 13 plan payments.  11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(5), 1328(a)(2).  If the debtor's obligation is "domestic support," the debtor must propose to pay it in full through a repayment plan, and the obligation will not be discharged unless it is paid in full. 

However, in Chapter 13, debts arising under § 523(a)(15) are dischargeable if the debtor receives a full-compliance discharge.  In re McCreary, 2009 WL 5215587 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2009).  Thus, if the obligation is not a support obligation but arises from a divorce or separation agreement or order, the debtor is only required to pay a required pro rata share of the funds available in the Chapter 13 plan.  The creditor spouse is treated as a general unsecured creditor and, upon successful completion of the plan, any remaining balance is discharged.  In re Rabideau, 2011 WL 165179 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2011).

Thus, the distinction between support and other obligations is significant in Chapter 13 cases.  "Whether a debt is nondischargeable as being in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support . . . is a matter of federal, not state, law."  In re Marriage of Lytle, 105 Ill.App.3d 1095 (1982).  11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) defines a domestic support obligation as a debt (1) owed to or recoverable by a spouse, former spouse or child; (2) that is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support; (3) that is established by a court order; and (4) that has not been assigned to a governmental entity.  State law is used to ascertain the incidents or nature of the debt to determine whether it fits within the federal exception.

Marriage of Lytle.  The label attached and the language of the decree or underlying agreement are not controlling in determining dischargeability; rather, one must look to the substance of the decree or agreement to determine the essential nature of the obligation.  Marriage of Lytle. 

Thus, courts have held that attorney's fees owed to a former spouse, or the former spouse's attorney, in conjunction with or awarded in the context of a support obligation have met the definition of "domestic support obligation".  See Johnson, discussed above; In re Papi, 427 B.R. 457 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010).

Whereas in Chapter 13 debts under § 523(a)(15) are potentially dischargeable, in Chapter 7 debts arising in the course of a divorce or separation are unqualifiedly non-dischargeable.  In re Harn, 2008 WL 130914 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008).  (However, note that §  523(a)(15) was markedly changed by BAPCPA; previously, courts applied a balancing approach to determine whether the debtor could reasonably afford to pay such debts and the resulting harm posed to the creditor spouse in the event of a discharge, and this approach no longer applies.)

Serious Consideration Required:  An individual and his or her attorney involved in settlement of a dissolution action should clearly set forth the intent of the parties and insure that it meets the federal definition for the type of obligation the agreement is attempting to achieve.  Furthermore, the parties should be made aware that particular obligations set forth in the agreement may ultimately be non-dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding.  Hold-harmless agreements have been held nondischargeable in Chapter 7 proceedings per § 523(a)(15), as have agreements to pay mortgage obligations.  See In re Walden, 312 B.R. 187 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2004).

For debtors with significant marital debt, consideration must be given to the benefit afforded in a Chapter 13 case, when selecting under which chapter to file.  In McCreary, discussed above, the bankruptcy court held that a former husband's filing of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy instead of a Chapter 7 to avoid, among other things, paying the full amount due his former wife under a property settlement was legitimate and not in bad faith.

Call us to schedule a consultation if you have any questions about these issues!

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Jon D. McLaughlin
(309) 319-6206


Wednesday, April 17, 2013

Case Law Updates

Omission of Payor's Social Security Number Rendered a Notice to Withhold Invalid.
In Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL App (2d) 120405, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, after serving a notice to withhold child support on an obligor's employer and not receiving any support payments, a support recipient sought a penalty against the employer for $100 per day that it failed to comply with the notice pursuant to 750 ILCS 28/35. However, the social security number of the obligor employee was omitted from the notice, so the appellate court held that such omission rendered the notice invalid because it did not comport to the strict requirements of 750 ILCS 28/20, which state that the income withholding notice shallinclude the social security number of the obligor. Because the statute itself is penal in nature against the employer who fails to comply, the recipient must strictly comply with all statutory requirements.
Marital Settlement Agreement Vacated for Unconscionability and Fraud.
In In re Marriage of Callahan, 2013 IL App (1st) 113751, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, a marital settlement agreement (MSA) entered into between a husband who had counsel and a wife who was pro se was vacated because it was deemed unconscionable and procured by fraud two years after the entry of judgment. After 29 years of marriage, the wife was awarded reviewable maintenance of $2,500 per month and the payment of her medical expenses for four years while the husband was awarded the marital residence and a pension worth $1.5 million. The court also found that the husband and his counsel made numerous misrepresentations of material facts at the prove-up regarding the nonmarital character of the residence and the valuation of the pension in comparison to the value of marital debts.
Oral Settlement Agreement Read into the Record on the First Day of Trial Is Valid and Binding on Both Parties.
In In re Marriage of Haller,2012 IL App (5th) 110478, 980 N.E.2d 261, 366 Ill.Dec. 461, on the day the parties were set for trial, they reached an agreement that was read into the record. They were advised of their right to proceed to a trial, but stated that they wished to enter the agreement and testified that they understood its terms and that it would be binding. After the court approved the agreement and entered judgment, and prior to the agreement being presented, the husband brought a motion to set aside the settlement agreement because he did not receive a $50,000 bonus which he anticipated at the time the oral agreement was made. On appeal, the husband argued that agreement was unenforceable because the statutory provisions under which maintenance would terminate were not read into the record; that the parties implicitly agreed that the final written agreement (not the oral agreement) was the actual agreement; and that when one of the parties is dissatisfied with an oral agreement and challenges it before written judgment is entered that he is not bound by the agreement. The appellate court held that the omission of the statutory termination events of maintenance from the record did not change the essential terms of the agreement; that there was no evidence in the record that the parties intended that the written agreement was a condition precedent to the binding effect of the oral agreement; and that the oral agreement was binding on both parties and cannot be disregarded simply because one party has second thoughts.
Severance of Joint Custody and Award of Sole Custody to the Father Appropriate.
The appellate court in In re Marriage of Debra N., 2013 IL App (1st) 122145, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, upheld a trial court's judgment which severed the award of joint custody and awarded sole custody to the father despite the fact that the report under 750 ILCS 5/604(b) opined that sole custody should be awarded to the mother. The evidence was replete with instances in which the mother had engaged in questionable conduct, including filing a removal petition on the grounds that she had an employment opportunity out of state while failing to offer any evidence of such opportunity. She also moved as far away as possible from the father without being in violation of the joint parenting agreement (JPA) and among other things, cancelled her subscription to the "Family Wizard" program. 2013 IL App (1st) 122145 at ¶29. The trial court found that the mother engaged in a pattern of behavior that could potentially alienate the child from her father. The court further opined that the statutory factor regarding the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent weighed heavily in the father's favor.
Award of Maintenance of $200 Per Month for Two Years Was Not an Abuse of Discretion.
In In re Marriage of Smith, 2012 IL App (2d) 110522, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, at trial on a petition for dissolution of marriage, the court heard extensive evidence regarding both parties' employment histories, earning capacities, expenses, and marital lifestyle. The court ordered the wife to pay to the husband $200 per month in maintenance for two years. While the husband was disabled, he was not permanently disabled and was able to be employed in some capacity. The husband admitted he was able to leave his house a few days a week to place bets at a dog track. It was uncontroverted that the wife had been the historical breadwinner during the long-term marriage. The parties had extensive debt and had filed for bankruptcy during the marriage while the wife worked full-time and overtime in order to pay the family's bills.
Court's Award of Guideline Child Support When the Parties Had Equal Parenting Time Was an Abuse of Discretion.
In In re Marriage of Smith, 2012 IL App (2d) 110522, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, the parties shared equal parenting time of the minor child, and therefore the trial court had two options in determining child support: (1) apportion the percentage of support between the parties or (2) disregard statutory guidelines and consider the factors in 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(2) and award an alternative figure. The record showed that the court did not review the §505 factors and instead just awarded 20 percent of the payor's net income. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a proper determination of support.

Call us to schedule a consultation if you have any questions about these issues!

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Jon D. McLaughlin
(309) 319-6206



Sunday, April 7, 2013

Telling the McLean County Circuit Clerk of your New Address

Written notice of address changes and name changes must be provided to the McLean County Circuit Clerk whenever there is a change for either the payor or the recipient. A change of address through the Post Office does not change the address on file with the Circuit Clerk and will only reroute the check temporarily. Please be sure to include your date of birth if you are making the change by mail. A Name/Address change form is available in the Circuit Clerk's office or online at the link at the bottom of this page. 

It is CRITICAL that address changes be promptly reported if payments are issued from the State Disbursement Unit (SDU). Only the Circuit Clerk's office can report this change electronically to the SDU. 

If you are concerned about a late payment and your payment comes from the SDU, you may contact them at1-877-225-7077. We suggest you contact the Clerk's office BEFORE contacting the SDU. The McLean County Circuit Clerk can frequently assist you in a more efficient manner and are certainly willing to help you solve any problems you might be experiencing. Please understand that they do not play a managing role in the operation of the SDU. A written affidavit is required by the SDU to stop payment on SDU checks. 


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Jon D. McLaughlin
(309) 319-6206