Marital Obligations in Bankruptcy Clarified Spouse’s Duty to Pay Opponent’s Attorney Fees May Be Held Non-Dischargeable in Bankruptcy

From Rebecca L. Reinhardt

Attorney fees ordered to be paid by one spouse on behalf of the other are non-dischargeable in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings, a bankruptcy judge in Central Illinois held recently.

In Johnson v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 2012 WL 2835462 (Bankr. C.D.Ill. 2012), the marital settlement agreement obligated the husband to pay the fees to the wife's divorce attorney, but the husband filed for bankruptcy before doing so.  Seeking to avoid the bankruptcy discharge, the wife's attorney argued to the bankruptcy court that the fees, though payable to him, were in the nature of a domestic support obligation and thus non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), and the bankruptcy court agreed.

The Bankruptcy Code actually has two provisions relevant to the treatment of marital obligations in bankruptcy: § 523(a)(5), excepting from discharge debts "for a domestic support allegation," and 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15), covering debts "to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor and not of the kind described in [§ 523(a)(5)] that is incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order" of a court or governmental unit.

In Johnson, the court said that after the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention & Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (119 Stat. 186) ("BAPCPA"), the distinction between domestic support obligations (§ 523(a)(5)) and other types of obligations arising out of the ending of a marital relationship (§ 523(a)(15)) is of no practical consequence in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy: neither is dischargeable in Chapter 7.  The court went on to state that it was of no consequence that the obligation was owed to the wife's attorney and not to the wife directly.  While 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) defines "domestic support obligation" as used in § 523(a)(5) as a debt "owed to or recoverable by" the spouse or child, courts have not interpreted the statute literally, looking instead to the nature of the debt and not to whom the debt is owed. Johnson followed that trend.

Chapter 13 Different:  However, there is a significant distinction between the dischargeability of debts arising from a divorce or separation in a Chapter 7 and a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding.

In Chapter 13, to obtain confirmation, plans must provide for payment in full of claims entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. § 507.  11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2).  "Domestic support obligations" are entitled to such priority.  § 507(a)(1)(A).  Further, "domestic support obligations" are excepted from the general discharge granted to debtors upon completion of Chapter 13 plan payments.  11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(5), 1328(a)(2).  If the debtor's obligation is "domestic support," the debtor must propose to pay it in full through a repayment plan, and the obligation will not be discharged unless it is paid in full. 

However, in Chapter 13, debts arising under § 523(a)(15) are dischargeable if the debtor receives a full-compliance discharge.  In re McCreary, 2009 WL 5215587 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2009).  Thus, if the obligation is not a support obligation but arises from a divorce or separation agreement or order, the debtor is only required to pay a required pro rata share of the funds available in the Chapter 13 plan.  The creditor spouse is treated as a general unsecured creditor and, upon successful completion of the plan, any remaining balance is discharged.  In re Rabideau, 2011 WL 165179 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2011).

Thus, the distinction between support and other obligations is significant in Chapter 13 cases.  "Whether a debt is nondischargeable as being in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support . . . is a matter of federal, not state, law."  In re Marriage of Lytle, 105 Ill.App.3d 1095 (1982).  11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) defines a domestic support obligation as a debt (1) owed to or recoverable by a spouse, former spouse or child; (2) that is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support; (3) that is established by a court order; and (4) that has not been assigned to a governmental entity.  State law is used to ascertain the incidents or nature of the debt to determine whether it fits within the federal exception.

Marriage of Lytle.  The label attached and the language of the decree or underlying agreement are not controlling in determining dischargeability; rather, one must look to the substance of the decree or agreement to determine the essential nature of the obligation.  Marriage of Lytle. 

Thus, courts have held that attorney's fees owed to a former spouse, or the former spouse's attorney, in conjunction with or awarded in the context of a support obligation have met the definition of "domestic support obligation".  See Johnson, discussed above; In re Papi, 427 B.R. 457 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010).

Whereas in Chapter 13 debts under § 523(a)(15) are potentially dischargeable, in Chapter 7 debts arising in the course of a divorce or separation are unqualifiedly non-dischargeable.  In re Harn, 2008 WL 130914 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008).  (However, note that §  523(a)(15) was markedly changed by BAPCPA; previously, courts applied a balancing approach to determine whether the debtor could reasonably afford to pay such debts and the resulting harm posed to the creditor spouse in the event of a discharge, and this approach no longer applies.)

Serious Consideration Required:  An individual and his or her attorney involved in settlement of a dissolution action should clearly set forth the intent of the parties and insure that it meets the federal definition for the type of obligation the agreement is attempting to achieve.  Furthermore, the parties should be made aware that particular obligations set forth in the agreement may ultimately be non-dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding.  Hold-harmless agreements have been held nondischargeable in Chapter 7 proceedings per § 523(a)(15), as have agreements to pay mortgage obligations.  See In re Walden, 312 B.R. 187 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2004).

For debtors with significant marital debt, consideration must be given to the benefit afforded in a Chapter 13 case, when selecting under which chapter to file.  In McCreary, discussed above, the bankruptcy court held that a former husband's filing of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy instead of a Chapter 7 to avoid, among other things, paying the full amount due his former wife under a property settlement was legitimate and not in bad faith.

Call us to schedule a consultation if you have any questions about these issues!

--
Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206

Case Law Updates

Omission of Payor's Social Security Number Rendered a Notice to Withhold Invalid.

In Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL App (2d) 120405, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, after serving a notice to withhold child support on an obligor's employer and not receiving any support payments, a support recipient sought a penalty against the employer for $100 per day that it failed to comply with the notice pursuant to 750 ILCS 28/35. However, the social security number of the obligor employee was omitted from the notice, so the appellate court held that such omission rendered the notice invalid because it did not comport to the strict requirements of 750 ILCS 28/20, which state that the income withholding notice shallinclude the social security number of the obligor. Because the statute itself is penal in nature against the employer who fails to comply, the recipient must strictly comply with all statutory requirements.

Marital Settlement Agreement Vacated for Unconscionability and Fraud.

In In re Marriage of Callahan, 2013 IL App (1st) 113751, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, a marital settlement agreement (MSA) entered into between a husband who had counsel and a wife who was pro se was vacated because it was deemed unconscionable and procured by fraud two years after the entry of judgment. After 29 years of marriage, the wife was awarded reviewable maintenance of $2,500 per month and the payment of her medical expenses for four years while the husband was awarded the marital residence and a pension worth $1.5 million. The court also found that the husband and his counsel made numerous misrepresentations of material facts at the prove-up regarding the nonmarital character of the residence and the valuation of the pension in comparison to the value of marital debts.

Oral Settlement Agreement Read into the Record on the First Day of Trial Is Valid and Binding on Both Parties.

In In re Marriage of Haller,2012 IL App (5th) 110478, 980 N.E.2d 261, 366 Ill.Dec. 461, on the day the parties were set for trial, they reached an agreement that was read into the record. They were advised of their right to proceed to a trial, but stated that they wished to enter the agreement and testified that they understood its terms and that it would be binding. After the court approved the agreement and entered judgment, and prior to the agreement being presented, the husband brought a motion to set aside the settlement agreement because he did not receive a $50,000 bonus which he anticipated at the time the oral agreement was made. On appeal, the husband argued that agreement was unenforceable because the statutory provisions under which maintenance would terminate were not read into the record; that the parties implicitly agreed that the final written agreement (not the oral agreement) was the actual agreement; and that when one of the parties is dissatisfied with an oral agreement and challenges it before written judgment is entered that he is not bound by the agreement. The appellate court held that the omission of the statutory termination events of maintenance from the record did not change the essential terms of the agreement; that there was no evidence in the record that the parties intended that the written agreement was a condition precedent to the binding effect of the oral agreement; and that the oral agreement was binding on both parties and cannot be disregarded simply because one party has second thoughts.

Severance of Joint Custody and Award of Sole Custody to the Father Appropriate.

The appellate court in In re Marriage of Debra N., 2013 IL App (1st) 122145, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, upheld a trial court's judgment which severed the award of joint custody and awarded sole custody to the father despite the fact that the report under 750 ILCS 5/604(b) opined that sole custody should be awarded to the mother. The evidence was replete with instances in which the mother had engaged in questionable conduct, including filing a removal petition on the grounds that she had an employment opportunity out of state while failing to offer any evidence of such opportunity. She also moved as far away as possible from the father without being in violation of the joint parenting agreement (JPA) and among other things, cancelled her subscription to the "Family Wizard" program. 2013 IL App (1st) 122145 at ¶29. The trial court found that the mother engaged in a pattern of behavior that could potentially alienate the child from her father. The court further opined that the statutory factor regarding the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent weighed heavily in the father's favor.

Award of Maintenance of $200 Per Month for Two Years Was Not an Abuse of Discretion.

In In re Marriage of Smith, 2012 IL App (2d) 110522, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, at trial on a petition for dissolution of marriage, the court heard extensive evidence regarding both parties' employment histories, earning capacities, expenses, and marital lifestyle. The court ordered the wife to pay to the husband $200 per month in maintenance for two years. While the husband was disabled, he was not permanently disabled and was able to be employed in some capacity. The husband admitted he was able to leave his house a few days a week to place bets at a dog track. It was uncontroverted that the wife had been the historical breadwinner during the long-term marriage. The parties had extensive debt and had filed for bankruptcy during the marriage while the wife worked full-time and overtime in order to pay the family's bills.

Court's Award of Guideline Child Support When the Parties Had Equal Parenting Time Was an Abuse of Discretion.

In In re Marriage of Smith, 2012 IL App (2d) 110522, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, the parties shared equal parenting time of the minor child, and therefore the trial court had two options in determining child support: (1) apportion the percentage of support between the parties or (2) disregard statutory guidelines and consider the factors in 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(2) and award an alternative figure. The record showed that the court did not review the §505 factors and instead just awarded 20 percent of the payor's net income. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a proper determination of support.

Call us to schedule a consultation if you have any questions about these issues!

--
Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206

Telling the McLean County Circuit Clerk of your New Address

Written notice of address changes and name changes must be provided to the McLean County Circuit Clerk whenever there is a change for either the payor or the recipient. A change of address through the Post Office does not change the address on file with the Circuit Clerk and will only reroute the check temporarily. Please be sure to include your date of birth if you are making the change by mail. A Name/Address change form is available in the Circuit Clerk's office or online at the link at the bottom of this page. 

It is CRITICAL that address changes be promptly reported if payments are issued from the State Disbursement Unit (SDU). Only the Circuit Clerk's office can report this change electronically to the SDU. 

If you are concerned about a late payment and your payment comes from the SDU, you may contact them at1-877-225-7077. We suggest you contact the Clerk's office BEFORE contacting the SDU. The McLean County Circuit Clerk can frequently assist you in a more efficient manner and are certainly willing to help you solve any problems you might be experiencing. Please understand that they do not play a managing role in the operation of the SDU. A written affidavit is required by the SDU to stop payment on SDU checks. 

NAME AND ADDRESS CHANGE FORM

--
Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 

Navigating Juvenile Court in Bloomington Illinois

By 

Bridget L. Schott

In the aftermath of the recession or perhaps just as a way expand ones business, it is likely that many attorneys find themselves taking on cases and clients in areas of law they may previously have been unfamiliar. Juvenile Law, and specifically as it pertains to Abuse and Neglect cases, is often one of those areas. Unfortunately, it can be an area that is quite overwhelming and unique, but in order to vigorously work for your client, there are many tools of the trade one should know. Having a working understanding of this area of law will allow you to hold the Department of Children and Family Services more accountable to your client as well as give your client the best possible chances for returning their child home.

The Juvenile Court Act of 1967 controls and provides the guidelines for the abuse/neglect cases. If your potential client comes to you after protective custody of their child has been taken by the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), then there a few things you can expect to have happened which led to that decision, and you will want to be able to explain these to your client. The severity of the implications of DCFS involvement should be stressed to your client from the outset, so that they can understand from the beginning that failure to cooperate could have an end result of their parental rights to their child being terminated.

In a typical case, a hotline report has been called into the DCFS hotline by a mandated reporter, which could include a school employee, child care personnel, medical personnel or law enforcement. That reporter is mandated to make a hotline report if they suspect a child has been abused or neglected, and can include situations where they have observed someone beating a child or hitting a child with an object, or they observe marks on a child's body that do not appear to have been caused by an accident, or where a child discloses that they have been harmed, or if a child appears to be undernourished, is dressed inappropriately for the weather or is young and has been left alone. A child having been born exposed to an illegal drug or a parent's drug use also leads to a hotline call.

Upon receipt of the hotline call, the DCFS Central Registry will have contacted a local DCFS Investigator to conduct an investigation into the allegations of the hotline call. The investigator was likely to have met with the parent who the allegations run against, as well as the named children. Hospital or school staff might also be interviewed and the children would be examined to see if there are present signs of abuse. If the investigator determines that the circumstances are severe enough, he or she will take temporary protective custody of the child or children and remove them from the parent's home. If that route is taken, the next step would be a shelter care hearing, and the parent should be advised to stay in contact with the Investigator. Even if the circumstances do not warrant taking protective custody of the child, the investigator may still find that the hotline report should be "indicated" for neglect or abuse and DCFS would offer services to the parent.

If a shelter care hearing is required, the DCFS investigator will have provided the investigation report to the State's Attorney's Office, who will prepare a petition with charges of abuse or neglect, and file it in the Circuit Court of either the county where the neglect happened or where the child resides. When children are taken into temporary protective custody, your client is entitled to (and the Juvenile Court Act requires) a Temporary Custody Hearing being held within 48 hours to determine whether the child shall be further held in custody.(705 ILCS 405/2-9(1) (West 2010) The petitioner (the State) is required to notify the minor's parent or guardian of the time and place of the hearing. If you have spoken to your potential client prior to this hearing occurring and decided to represent the parent, the shelter care, or Temporary Custody Hearing would be the first opportunity to enter one's appearance.

At the Temporary Custody Hearing, parents are served with petitions in the matter and evidence is presented to the court so a probable cause determination can be made. This can be done through a proffer of reports from DCFS and other agencies or through testimony by the DCFS Investigator. It is proper for the Circuit Court to consider previous indicated reports of abuse and neglect through the DCFS central registry which involve the minor's parent, guardian or custodian. 705 ILCS 405/2-10(2) (West 2010) As an advocate for the respondent parent, the most probable opportunity for persuading a court to deny a shelter care request and place the child back with the respondent parent is through highlighting that there exists no immediate or urgent necessity to remove the child or that DCFS has not documented the reasonable efforts that were made to prevent or eliminate the necessity of removal of the minor from the home. An avenue to explore may be why a safety plan was chosen as the desired route instead of protective custody.

You may find that instead of a potential client coming to you the day DCFS takes protective custody of the child, they come to you after the Shelter Care hearing has already taken place. If your client has not attended the hearing and you are within 10 days of the hearing, the Juvenile Court Act allows your client an opportunity for a Rehearing on Temporary Custody, so that they have an opportunity to be heard and understand the reasoning for custody of the children being taken. 705 ILCS 405/2-10(3) (West 2010)

If, despite your best efforts for your client, temporary custody is granted to DCFS, then there are additional requirements that the State and/or DCFS must comply with in the process of advancing toward an adjudicatory hearing. If the Juvenile Court Act requires the State or DCFS to comply with an action or a filing and they fail to do so, then, depending on the infraction, it may be proper and in the best interest of your client to file a motion to dismiss based on that failure, or at least explore a motion to compel the filing. For example, the Juvenile Court Act requires that when DCFS is appointed as the temporary custodian, they "shall file with the court and serve on the parties a parent-child visitation plan, within 10 days, excluding weekends and holidays, after the appointment." 705 ILCS 405/2-10(2) (West 2010) Visitation with the child is such an important thing for your client that you should absolutely insist this statute be adhered to by DCFS. The "shall" in the statute is indicative of the importance placed on it by the legislature. The statute further explains that the frequency, duration and locations of visitation shall be measured by the needs of the child and the family, and not by the convenience of Department personnel.

As counsel for the parent it is your duty to explain to your client that acceptance of services shall not be considered an admission of any of the allegations in the petition. If your client chooses the wise route of engaging in services offered by DCFS to correct conditions that led protective custody to be taken, they should know that the Juvenile Court Act does not allow that information to be used against them at the Adjudicatory hearing. DCFS is obligated to begin offering services at the outset of the case, and establishing the requirements which will be expected out of a parent in order to regain their children, and publishing them in a Client Service Plan. For your client's sake, cooperating in services and following the Client Service Plan would be in their best interest as well, for parents are only entitled to 9 months after the adjudicatory hearing to make progress and efforts toward returning the child home and correcting the conditions that led to the child being taken, before a Termination of Parental Rights petition could be filed. Your client should be encouraged to keep an open line of communication with their caseworker, as this will facilitate the best results toward regaining their child.

The Adjudicatory Hearing is a fancy phrase for the trial on the State's Petition for Wardship based on the abuse or neglect. As all actions under the Juvenile Court Act are civil in nature, the State must prove its case using a preponderance of the evidence standard. Abuse and neglect cases employ some rules of evidence that are quite unique, and many of them can only be found in the caselaw for your specific appellate court district. By statute, there are some areas of juvenile law that constitute prima facie evidence of abuse or neglect, including having a medical diagnosis of battered child syndrome, failure to thrive syndrome, fetal alcohol syndrome or has been a victim of any number of sex crimes. 705 ILCS 2-18(2) (West 2010) Medical records are admissible to the court, as well as any indicated report held by DCFS. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) and (b) (West 2010) As an example of caselaw driving the rules of evidence, the 4th District has ruled that the entire DCFS investigatory file is not admissible for the Circuit Court to consider in its ruling; only the "indicated report" portion of the investigative file is admissible. In re J.C., 2012 IL App (4th) 110861, 966 N.E.2d 453. The Juvenile Court Act also requires the proceedings to work on a fairly tight schedule. The Adjudicatory hearing must commence within 90 days of the date of service of process on the parties. 705 ILCS 405/2-14(b) (West 2010) The time limit is quite strict, and the adjudicatory hearing can only be continued beyond the 90 day mark one time, for up to 30 days, and only if the continuance is consistent with the health, safety and best interests of the minor and approved by the court. 705 ILCS 405/2-14(c)(West 2010) If the case continues beyond that point, it may be in your client's best interests to file a motion to dismiss, and it could likely be granted.

A finding that the State has proven its counts of abuse or neglect at the Adjudicatory Hearing does not end your responsibility in the case. The Dispositional Hearing is equally as important as the Adjudicatory Hearing as it determines whether it is in the best interest for the child to be made a ward of the court or whether it would be safe to return the child to one of the respondent parents with certain conditions. The hearing allows the Court and attorneys to examine the services which will be provided to the respondent parents, and to make suggestions of additions or deletions as required. If the only barrier for your client regaining their child is one of financial circumstances alone, then you should request custody and guardianship to be returned to your client, as financial circumstances alone do not support an unfitness finding. If custody and/or guardianship of the child is granted to DCFS, Permanency Hearings shall follow the Dispositional Hearing every 6 months to assess the parents progress and efforts toward returning the child home. DCFS is also under requirements to the Court to put forth reasonable efforts in providing parents the services they need to regain their child. If your client is not receiving the services they need, you should consider requesting that DCFS has not upheld its end of the bargain. Your representation of your client can end one of two ways, at opposite ends of the spectrum. Your client will either have custody and guardianship of their child restored to them, if they have successfully completed all their requirements, or a Termination of Parental Rights petition will be pursued, and your client may lose all rights to their child. The severity of the implications of these proceedings should be stressed to your client at every step of the process.

In conclusion, the area of abuse and neglect law is rich with opportunities for litigation, but is not an undertaking to be taken lightly. The lives of children and the futures of families weigh on the backs of the attorneys involved. Having a working knowledge of the process of juvenile courts is imperative to your success. Taking on a client in a case like this requires dedication to a potentially years-long court process, but the success of your client regaining their children can be quite rewarding.

--
Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 

New Parenting Coordination Rule in Bloomington Illinois Divorces

ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT RULE 120

Effective January 1, 2013.

D. Parenting Coordination in Dissolution and Family Cases (McLean County)

In an effort to provide the citizens of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit with an expeditious and expense saving alternative to traditional litigation in the resolution of high conflict custody and visitation cases, a program of Parenting Coordination is hereby established in McLean County.

1. Appointment - The Court may appoint a parenting coordinator when it finds the following:

a. The parties failed to adequately cooperate and communicate with regard to issues involving their children, or have been unable to implement a parenting plan or parenting schedule;

b. Mediation has not been successful or has been determined by the judge to be inappropriate; or

c. The appointment of a parenting coordinator is in the best interests of the child or children involved in the proceedings.

Notwithstanding the above, the court may appoint a parenting coordinator by agreement of the parties.

2. Qualification - The parenting coordinator shall possess the Minimum Qualifications of Matrimonial and Family Dispute Mediators which have been established by the Chief Judge of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit.

3. Confidentiality - Communications with the parenting coordinator shall not be confidential, except that upon the agreement of both parties and the parenting coordinator, the court may deem all or any specific part of the communications with the parenting coordinator to be confidential, if such designation appears to be in the best interests of the children.

4. Duties:

a. The parenting coordinator shall educate, mediate, monitor court orders and make recommendations to the court as necessary. In addition, the parenting coordinator may recommend approaches that will reduce conflict between parents and reduce unnecessary stress for the children.

b. The parenting coordinator may monitor parental behaviors and mediate disputes concerning parenting issues and report any allegations of noncompliance to the court, if necessary.

c. The parenting coordinator shall recommend outside resources as needed, such as random drug screens, parenting classes and psychotherapy.

d. The parenting coordinator may recommend detailed guidelines or rules for communication between parents.

e. The parenting coordinator shall maintain communication among all parties by serving, if necessary, as a conduit for information.

f.  The parenting coordinator may meet with the parties, the children, and significant others jointly or separately. The parenting coordinator shall determine if the appointments shall be joint or separate.

g. Each parent should direct any disagreements or concerns regarding the children to the parenting coordinator.

h. The parenting coordinator shall work with both parents to attempt to resolve the conflict and, if necessary, shall recommend an appropriate resolution to the parents.

i.  The parenting coordinator shall not have any decision-making authority which is the sole province of the court.

j.  The parenting coordinator shall not serve as a custody evaluator in any proceeding involving one or more parties for whom the parenting coordinator has provided parenting coordination services.

k. The parenting coordinator shall not be permitted to give a recommendation or opinion concerning the ultimate issue of fact, law, or mixed issue of fact and law as to child custody, primary physical residence, or visitation. Recommendations or opinions on lesser issues, as stated above, may be conveyed by the parenting coordinator to the parents and the court.

l.  No parenting coordinator shall be held liable for civil damages for any act or omission in the scope of the parenting coordinator's employment or function, unless such person acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of the rights, safety or property of another.

5. Expenses of the Parties – Expenses of the Parent Coordinator shall be borne by the parties and shall not be assessed against or paid for by McLean County.

Call us to schedule a consultation if you have any questions about these issues!

--
Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206

Bloomington Legal Newsletter: McLean County Docket

You can see what court cases are coming up in the next 14 days by visiting the following site: http://www.mcleancountyil.gov/index.aspx?NID=540

--
Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 

Child Support Maintenance Fee Payment in McLean County Child Support Cases

Child Support Records Maintenance Annual Fee

In child support and maintenance cases, Illinois statute 705 ILCS 105/27.1a (bb)(4) authorizes the circuit clerk to collect an annual fee of $36 "…from the person [payer] making payment for maintaining child support records and the processing of support orders to the State of Illinois KIDS system and the recording of payments issued by the State Disbursement Unit for the official record of the Court." 

This annual clerk's fee is in addition to and separate from amounts ordered to be paid as maintenance or child support, and is used by the circuit clerk to maintain child support orders and record all payments issued by the State Disbursement Unit for the official record of the Court. 

Each year the circuit clerk's office sends reminder notices to the last known address of each payer. 

Failure to pay your annual clerk's fee may affect your credit rating. 

You may make your annual clerk's fee payment using your credit card. 

Online Payments
To pay ONLINE you will need the following information in order to make a payment: 

·         Case #

·         Dollar Amount You Are Paying

·         A Valid MasterCard, Visa, Discover or American Express Card

*A convenience fee of 3.5% of the payment or $3.50 minimum will be added to the amount of fees due for this service. Government Payment Services (GPS) is an independent company that charges this fee for its services. The Court and Circuit Clerk's office receives no part of the convenience fee. 

Pay your maintenance fee online.

 

-- 
Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 

How to Obtain a Copy of Your McLean County Divorce Judgment

In McLean County Illinois, copies of your court file are always available for you, either from the actual file or from a microfilm of your case.

The cost for photocopies is $2.00 for the first page, .50 per page for the next 19 pages, then .25 per page for each page thereafter. Certification may be had for an additional $10.00 upon request.

The Clerk asks that you have the caption of the case, the case number if possible, or the year in which the case was filed to assist them in retrieving your records. If you need several years searched, the cost is $6.00 per year for record searches.

Please note: Cases from the 1960's (Divorce Records) are stored at an off-site facility and it can take 1-2 days to retrieve these files for inspection and copying. Please let the Clerk know by phone or e-mail and they can work with you to eliminate unnecessary trips to their office.

You may request copies in person during their business hours of M-F 8:30-4:30, or in writing or by e-mail. The cost of all copies must be paid in advance of any mailing. Please make checks/money orders payable to: McLean County Circuit Clerk. 

The Clerk will advise you of the cost of your copies. Do not send cash via the mail.

The Clerk's Address is:
McLean County Circuit Clerk- Attn: Family Division
PO Box 2420
Bloomington, IL 61702-2420 or

--
Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 

McLean County Family Visitation Center (Bloomington Illinois)

A lot of clients need help with supervised visitation or visitation exchanges in a public place. The Visitation Center in Bloomington Illinois is one resource in these types of cases

McLean County Family Visitation Center

McLean County is located in central Illinois about an hour northeast of Springfield. 

According to the US Census Bureau, the 2004 estimated population of McLean County is 158,006 with a land area of 1,184 square miles. 

In 2004, 182 Emergency Orders of Protection, 13 Interim Orders of Protection and 175 Plenary Orders of Protection were entered into the Law Enforcement Administrative Data System (LEADS).

Development of the McLean County Family Visitation Center:

In 1999, the McLean County Domestic Violence Task Force, established in the mid 1990's, composed of community members, churches, the Sheriff's Department, the State's Attorney, victim advocates and partner abuse intervention service providers began exploring the issues of children in families with domestic violence and specifically the lack of safety during exchanges for both victims and their children.  The Task Force determined the community needed a center that would allow for safe visitation exchanges that would help protect both children experiencing domestic violence and the victim.   

The Task Force supported The Children's Foundation when they applied for, and received, a pilot grant from the Illinois Violence Prevention Authority (IVPA) to develop and implement a visitation exchange center. 

The McLean County Family Visitation Center opened September 1999 and currently serves seven families a month.

Program Administration

The Children's Foundation provides fiscal and personnel oversight for the McLean County Family Visitation Center.

Site/Location

The McLean County Family Visitation Center is located at the offices of The Children's

Foundation in Bloomington.  The facility has both a front and back entrance so parents arrive through separate entrances.  The custodial parent uses the front entrance and the non-custodial parent uses the back entrance.

The Visitation Center is open from 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. Monday through Sunday where exchanges can occur at any time.  The agency averages about 12 hours a week in exchanges.

Security

Security cameras are located in the McLean County Family Visitation Center parking lots, building hallways and in the visitation room.  Parents are videotaped from the time of their arrival to the time of their departure.  Parents are informed of the cameras during the intake interview and sign a form that they are aware of the cameras and that they are being videotaped. 

There is a panic button on the wall and a portable panic button that is carried by the staff that notifies law enforcement immediately.

Funding

The Children's Foundation received funding for a pilot grant from IVPA for two years. They were notified by IVPA in May of 2001 that the McLean County Family Visitation Center would not be eligible for funding in fiscal year 2002 due to changes in prevention criteria used by IVPA.  With the loss of this funding, the Foundation's board of directors began a fundraising effort.  The Foundation received a one time grant from the county for $10,000 in 2003 as well as a two year federal Safe Havens Grant in October 2004.  The Foundation is reapplying for Safe Havens funding for 2006-2008.

Additional funding is generated from intake fees and exchanges.  The non-custodial parent is charged a $25.00 intake fee and each parent is charged $5.00 per exchange, collected at the time of the exchange.  In cases of financial hardship, a family can write a letter to the Visitation Center requesting a fee waiver or fee reduction.  Staff determines if a waiver is granted on a case-by-case basis. 

Staffing

The McLean County Visitation Center is staffed with social workers employed by The Children's Foundation.  Typically, one staff person is scheduled for exchanges, but if there are exchanges scheduled where either of the parents are exhibiting certain risk factors, additional staff will be added.  The Visitation Center also has students in the Masters of Social Work program from Illinois State University who assist with exchanges.

During their first year at the Foundation, new staff, volunteers and interns complete a 15 hour training course covering stages of child development, the effects of divorce, family violence including intimate partner abuse, child abuse, and mandated reporting for child abuse.  Annually, ten hours of continuing education training is provided for staff.  

Protocols/Procedures Types of cases

A court order is not required in order to use the McLean County Family Visitation Center but families must have been or are experiencing domestic violence, physical abuse, sexual abuse, or stalking.  Referrals may come from the court, attorneys, shelters and other social service agencies or as a self-referral from the family.

Procedures -- Intake

Both parents are required to schedule an intake assessment before the Visitation Center will begin providing supervised exchanges:  

The parents are interviewed individually and the following information is covered: A Client Fact Sheet that includes the names of parents, contact information and the names of the children; A Legal Information Form that includes information on any current or expired orders of protection, court orders for visitation, docket numbers and the names of any judges presiding over cases between the parties and the attorneys representing them; A social history that contains any family history of violence; The guidelines for using the Visitation Center; Each parent signs a form indicating that they have received the rules of the Visitation Center, an Informed Consent to Participate in Services, the Statement of Confidentiality, the Clients Rights Statement, and the Appeal/Grievance Policy for Persons Served.

  Exchange Process

The non-custodial parent arrives 10 minutes before the exchange and enters through the rear entrance.

The custodial parent arrives at the designated time of the exchange through the front entrance.

The staff will bring the child to the non-custodial parent who is waiting in the visitation room. 

The non-custodial parent will wait 15 minutes with the child while the custodial parent leaves the building.

When returning the non-custodial parent and child arrive 15 minutes before the exchange.

The custodial parent arrives at the designated time of the exchange, picks up the child and leaves.

The non-custodial parent waits 15 minutes and then leaves.

Records and Reporting

The Visitation Center provides reports to the court on a quarterly basis.  The reports include a summary of the services provided, reasons for cancellation of an exchange, no shows, observations and concerns of the staff and recommendations if appropriate.  Reports are filed more frequently if there is a pressing issue.  The reports filed with the court are also sent to the clients and their attorneys.

Other Services Provided

The Children's Foundation is a child welfare agency and part of Children's Home & Aid Society of Illinois.  Services available include supervised visitation, transportation to and from visits, parenting/child groups, therapy, and an on-site crisis nursery. 

Data Collection

Due to the fact that the McLean County Family Visitation Center is funded by Safe Havens, the Visitation Center uses a required database from the Department of Justice that includes demographic information, reasons for referrals, family issues and the number of exchanges.

Advisory Committee

The McLean County Family Visitation Center has an advisory committee that meets quarterly. 

The role of this committee is to advise the program on policies and programming as they relate to the Visitation Center.  The committee includes representation from the following groups: women's advocates, child abuse services, Illinois State University School of Social Work, family law attorneys, legal services, family law division judges, physicians, the state's attorney's office, child protection, law enforcement and court administration.

Promotion/Marketing

A brochure on the McLean County Family Visitation Center is distributed to judges, attorneys and service providers.  The Visitation Center hosts annual trainings for judges, attorneys and law enforcement.

  

If you have any questions regarding the McLean County Visitation Center, or other Child Custody or Visitation matters, please contact my office to schedule a Consultation.

--
Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206

Grounds for Divorce in Bloomington Illinois

When you file a Petition for Dissolution, you must allege specific grounds that entitle you to the relief you are seeking—namely, a divorce. In the past, a person could not be divorced without a very good reason. Now, however, in addition to legal separations, Illinois law offers divorces in two flavors: those where a specific reason is given ("grounds), and those where no reason is given ("irreconcilable differences"). The various grounds are discussed below:

Irreconcilable Differences:

In Illinois we use the term "irreconcilable differences" to describe what others know as a "no fault divorce." To be accurate, it would be proper to view irreconcilable differences as a modified no-fault basis of dissolution, because, unlike other states in which true no-fault grounds exist, there are some minimal prerequisites to receiving a judgment under irreconcilable differences. To be granted a divorce, you must prove that irreconcilable differences have caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, that past efforts at reconciliation have failed, that future efforts at reconciliation would be impracticable and not in the best interests of the family.

In Illinois, to proceed using "irreconcilable differences" as the grounds for divorce the parties must live "separate and apart" for at least two years before their case may be concluded. You may file your case while you're still living together, but you must live separate and apart for two years before the case can be finalized.

The two-year waiting requirement can be waived if both parties sign a special waiver form. Even then, however, they must still live separate and apart for at least six months before the case may be finalized.

Grounds:

The ten traditional grounds for dissolution of marriage in Illinois are specified in 750 ILCS 5/401(a)(1):

Impotence

Impotence is not a common or often-used ground. The seminal case discussing it is from 1912. Kinkaid v. Kinkaid, 100 N.E. 217 (1912). "Naturally impotent" means incurably so, whether the impotence is caused by a disease, a permanent physical defect, or an accident. Griffeth v. Griffeth, 44 N.E. 820 (1896). The statute also requires the impotence to have been in existence at the time the marriage took place.

Bigamy

Bigamy is a ground not only for dissolution of marriage but also for a declaration of invalidity. 750 ILCS 5/212(a)(1). The fact that the petitioner knew or should have known of the earlier marriage is not a ground for denying a divorce, but it may be a factor in deciding whether to grant alimony or maintenance. Belluomini v. Belluomini, 392 N.E.2d 669 (1st Dist. 1979). The statute specifies that children born of a bigamous marriage are legitimate and are entitled to the same considerations regarding child support as children of a monogamous marriage. 750 ILCS 5/212(c), 5/303.

Adultery

Surprisingly, there is little case law addressing the definition of "adultery" and standards of proof. Most cases seem to assume the definition and address other issues, perhaps because "adultery" has a common meaning. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, p. 52 (7th ed. 1999), defines it as "[v]oluntary sexual intercourse between a married person and a person other than the

offender's spouse." This definition seems to be the generally accepted one. In order to establish adultery, there must be proof of a carnal act. Wolfrum v. Wolfrum, 126 N.E.2d 34 (3rd Dist. 1955). Because adultery can seldom be proved by direct evidence, it may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

        One may demonstrate facts and circumstances from which adultery can reasonably be inferred. Marcy v. Marcy, 79 N.E.2d 207 (1947). The adultery must be without the fault or provocation of the other spouse. If the person alleging adultery was himself living with a woman other than his wife prior to the time he alleged his wife committed adultery, his wife's alleged adultery may have been provoked by the husband's prior adultery or based on his fault. See Cuneo v. Cuneo, 399 N.E.2d 1384 (2nd Dist. 1980). Note also that adultery is a crime in Illinois. 720 ILCS 5/11-7.

Wilful desertion or absence for the space of one year

Desertion, to constitute a legal ground in Illinois, must be against the will of the petitioner and without reasonable cause and must have lasted for at least one year. Boyd v. Boyd, 207 N.E.2d 350 (5th Dist. 1965). Desertion requires proof of "an actual abandonment and abnegation of all marital relationships with an intent not to return and without legal justification or consent of the other spouse." Lemon v. Lemon, 150 N.E.2d 608 (1958). Since it must be willful and without cause, spouses who choose to sever their marital relationship by mutual consent cannot properly assert statutory desertion as a ground for dissolution. If one spouse asks the other to return, however, and the latter refuses, then desertion exists as a ground. Conversely, if a spouse who left asks to return within the statutory period and is denied, that spouse may not be charged with desertion. Metoyer v. Metoyer, 235 N.E.2d 882 (1st Dist. 1968). Finally, if one of the spouses moves out of the marital residence and files a petition for dissolution of marriage on any ground, he or she may technically be subject to a counterpetition based on desertion once a year has passed. The time that litigation is pending counts toward that one-year minimum period. 750 ILCS 5/401(a)(1). Constructive desertion occurs when one of the spouses through acts of unprovoked brutality or cruelty forces the other spouse out of the marital residence. Dayan v. Dayan, 229 N.E.2d 568 (5th Dist. 1967).

Habitual drunkenness for the space of two years

In Murphy v. Murphy, 334 N.E.2d 779 (1st Dist. 1975), the court defined "habitual drunkenness" as:

an irresistible habit of getting drunk . . . a fixed habit of drinking to excess . . . an involuntary tendency to become intoxicated, which is acquired by frequent repetition, — such a frequent indulgence to excess as to show a formed habit and inability to control the appetite.

Quoting Garrett v. Garrett, 96 N.E. 882 (1911).

The two-year period referred to in the statute need not be continuous, and short, voluntary periods of abstention will not affect the finding of habitual drunkenness. Bissekumer v. Bissekumer, 57 N.E.2d 521 (2nd Dist. 1944).

Gross and confirmed habits caused by the excessive use of addictive drugs for the space of two years

The statute itself clarifies that "excessive use of addictive drugs" refers to "use of an addictive drug by a person when using the drug becomes a controlling or a dominant purpose of his life." 750 ILCS 5/401(a)(1).

Attempting the life of the spouse by poison or other means showing malice

It is interesting that 750 ILCS 5/401(a)(1) still provides that, as a ground for dissolution, an attempt on the life of a spouse must be not only without provocation but also by a means showing malice. It is difficult to think of any means of attempting to take a spouse's life that would not show malice, but the statute is what it is. See In re Marriage of Davenport, 416 N.E.2d 88 (4th Dist. 1981) (wife's pouring and lighting kerosene on bed where her husband was lying established grounds entitling him to divorce based on mental cruelty).

Extreme and repeated physical or mental cruelty

Other than the no-fault provisions of 750 ILCS 5/401(a)(2), this ground is probably the most common for dissolution of marriage. "Extreme and repeated mental cruelty" has been defined as a pattern of abusive and humiliating treatment, calculated or obviously of a nature to torture, discommode, or render miserable the life of the spouse, which actually affects the physical or mental health of the spouse. Deahl v. Deahl, 300 N.E.2d 497 (1st Dist. 1973). There must be at least two incidents to meet the "repeated" requirement. The appellate court has defined "mental cruelty" as follows:

Mental cruelty is a course of unprovoked, offensive conduct toward one's spouse which causes embarrassment, humiliation, and anguish so as to render the spouse's life miserable and unendurable, and which actually affects the spouse's physical or mental health.

In re Marriage of Reeder, 570 N.E.2d 876 (3rd Dist. 1991).

In determining whether conduct constitutes extreme and repeated mental cruelty, the court is to apply a subjective rather than an objective standard. Akin v. Akin, 260 N.E.2d 481 (4th Dist. 1970). The court's function is not to determine whether the respondent's conduct would have been cruel to a reasonable person or to a person of average sensibilities. It is to determine whether it was, in fact, cruel to the petitioner.

Extreme and repeated physical cruelty is established by two acts of physical violence committed on separate occasions or with enough time between the actions so that they can be considered separate. Kovack v. Kovack, 268 N.E.2d 258, 259 (1st Dist. 1971). The actions must be both extreme and repeated, and a single act of physical cruelty is insufficient as a ground for dissolution of marriage. Godfrey v. Godfrey, 1 N.E.2d 777 (4th Dist. 1936). Slight acts of physical cruelty are also insufficient. Bidstrup v. Bidstrup, 196 N.E.2d 512 (2nd Dist. 1964).

Conviction of a felony or other infamous crime

For the definition of a "felony," see 720 ILCS 5/2-7 (a felony is a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for one or more years). See also In re Marriage of Ducey, 428 N.E.2d 1165 (5th Dist. 1981) (degree of offense must be measured by statute, and court cannot simply find offense comparable to felony and thus basis for divorce).

Infection of the spouse with a sexually transmitted disease

There is no appellate or Supreme Court case in Illinois discussing infection with a sexually transmitted disease as a ground for dissolution of marriage. Perhaps because the plaintiff may proceed on other grounds, or perhaps because of the sensitive nature of these allegations, this ground is rarely used. However, the statutory language is broad, and more venereal diseases than syphilis and gonorrhea are covered. It is unclear if acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) would be covered. It would seem so, but to date there has been no ruling to that effect. You should be aware that intentional infliction of these diseases may also constitute a tort, which you can plead as a cause of action separate from the one for dissolution.

Lack of cause or provocation:

The section of the statute that cites the ten grounds begins the list by stating the following: "That, without cause or provocation by the petitioner, the respondent. . ." 750 ILCS 5/401(a)(1). The rules of statutory construction dictate that this predicate governs all the following ten grounds and that the petitioner, for each ground asserted, must allege that it was without the petitioner's fault or provocation. 

Conclusion:

In most cases, grounds is not a topic that should consume too much discussion. It is usually dealt with is an expeditious manner. However, it is a matter that demands strict compliance in order to be awarded a Judgment for Dissolution. If you have any questions, don't hesitate to ask me!

--
Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting            (309) 319-6206      end_of_the_skype_highlighting


THIS MESSAGE AND ANY ATTACHMENTS MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL, PRIVILEGED, AND EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. ANY RECIPIENT OTHER THAN THE INTENDED RECIPIENT IS ADVISED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION, COPYING, OR OTHER USE OF THIS MESSAGE IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.

IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS MESSAGE IN ERROR, PLEASE NOTIFY THE SENDER IMMEDIATELY.

IRS CIRCULAR 230 NOTICE: To the extent that this message or any attachment concerns tax matters, it is not intended to be used and cannot be used by a taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties that may be imposed by law.

Here in Bloomington, in camera interviews are not rare, as opposed to other surrounding counties, so this new case from the Appellate Court may be interesting to some in McLean County:

Grunstad v. Cooper

Illinois Appellate Court

Civil Court

Citation

Case Number: 

 2012 IL App (3d) 120524

Decision Date: 

 October 17, 2012

District: 

 3d Dist.

Division/County: 

 La Salle Co.

Justice: 

 CARTER

Holding: 

 Affirmed.

http://www.state.il.us/court/opinions/AppellateCourt/2012/3rdDistrict/3120524.pdf

Court's custody decision reflected thorough consideration of evidence for custody, and did not err in granting mother's motion for directed verdict. Court was within its discretion in denying father's motion to conduct in camera interview of parties' 14-year-old child, as court had other evidence of child's custody preference. (HOLDRIDGE and McDADE, concurring.)

--
Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 


THIS MESSAGE AND ANY ATTACHMENTS MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL, PRIVILEGED, AND EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. ANY RECIPIENT OTHER THAN THE INTENDED RECIPIENT IS ADVISED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION, COPYING, OR OTHER USE OF THIS MESSAGE IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.

IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS MESSAGE IN ERROR, PLEASE NOTIFY THE SENDER IMMEDIATELY.

IRS CIRCULAR 230 NOTICE: To the extent that this message or any attachment concerns tax matters, it is not intended to be used and cannot be used by a taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties that may be imposed by law.

Illinois Supreme Court announces new standards for e-filing in trial courts

From: IllinoisLawyer

Chief Justice Thomas L. Kilbride and the Illinois Supreme Court announced on Wednesday new statewide standards and new and amended Supreme Court rules that will allow all courts in Illinois to begin electronic filing of court documents in civil cases.

To date, only five counties in Illinois have been approved to operate e-filing systems as part of a pilot project, mostly on a limited basis. Those counties are Cook, DuPage, Madison, St. Clair and Will. The announcement ends the pilot stage of e-filing in Illinois and allows all circuit court clerks to move to permanent and on-going procedures, if they so wish.

The new statewide principles and standards, new Supreme Court Rule 138 and amended Supreme Court Rule 201, give the go-ahead to civil case e-filing while placing an emphasis on protecting against identify theft and disclosure of sensitive information. They do this by protecting personal identity information such as Social Security numbers, birth dates, mother's maiden names, driver's license numbers, financial account numbers and debit and credit card numbers. This information will be barred from documents or exhibits filed with the court—whether in a paper or electronic filing. Discovery responses are prohibited from filing as well, absent leave of court.

The new standards and rules will apply only to civil cases. They are the product of the Illinois Supreme Court Special E-Business Committee announced by Chief Justice Kilbride in June 2011, chaired by Chicago lawyer Bruce Pfaff.

"Illinois is behind on using e-business and e-filing in its courts. We know that," said Chief Justice Kilbride. "These uniform, statewide standards allow e-filing in our courts; it is no longer part of a wish list. Circuit courts may now use e-filing's greater efficiencies and long-range cost savings in addition to offering a modern way of doing things."

The Supreme Court also announced Wednesday an amendment to Supreme Court Rule 11 to allow service of documents electronically in the trial courts. Attorneys and parties must include an e-mail address for service of documents on appearances and pleadings filed in the court.

The new standards and rules will go into effect January 1, 2013. This will allow Circuit Court clerks, chief judges, judges and attorneys sufficient lead time to make required changes to court operations and automated systems. In the interim, the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts, under Director Michael J. Tardy, will schedule regional meetings with stakeholders including chief judges, circuit court clerks and court management system vendors to chart the way to best move forward for each individual county.

"This is a great day," said Mr. Pfaff, who runs a law office that is essentially paperless. "Behind the initiative of Chief Justice Kilbride and approval of e-business by the entire Supreme Court, the legal system in Illinois will become more efficient and significantly less expensive to operate. Any county that wishes can adopt e-filing and electronic document management systems and start to take advantage of the power of computers.

"Issues relating to personal privacy have been resolved to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court and those committees which studied the matter. Our committee thanks all of the court clerks and their staffs from around the country that freely gave their time and expertise to help us choose a set of standards and guidelines that allows Illinois to move forward."

There are several jurisdictions around the nation, including the federal courts' PACER system that uses e-filing and other e-technologies. But there are special challenges associated with e-filing in Illinois.

The challenges stem from the fact that Illinois is comprised of 102 counties organized within 23 Circuit Court jurisdictions and five Appellate districts. Both the state and the counties provide financial support for the operation of the courts. Complicating the matter further in Illinois, there are at least 12 different Circuit Court management software systems operating in the various court jurisdictions. Under the new statewide standards, these management systems have to be integrated with any e-filing program.

Implementation requires the cooperation of various entities within a county, including software vendors.

"The Chief Judge and the elected Circuit Court Clerk will have to agree on implementing an e-filing program and inform the Supreme Court that their system is in accordance with the standards and the rules," said Mr. Tardy, who serves as director of the Supreme Court's administrative arm. "Each county has different priorities, needs and resources. I expect some counties, especially those which have been operating pilot programs, will choose to go forward as soon as they can. Others may wait to see how e-filing develops in counties similar to theirs."

New Supreme Court Rule 138, which applies to both paper and electronic filings, defines and prohibits personal identity information from inclusion in documents or exhibits filed with the court and if a court orders the filing of documents that contain personal identity information, it establishes specific steps to file it under seal in a separate document.

Supreme Court Rule 201 is amended to prohibit the filing of any discovery, which often contains sensitive and personal information, and much of which does not rise to evidence at trial. The e-filing standards do not preclude an e-filing vendor from charging fees for electronic filing, but no additional fee may be charged by the clerk of the circuit court, and no vendor fee may be shared with the clerk.

Since his colleagues elected him Chief Justice in October 2010, Chief Justice Kilbride has moved to make Illinois court operations more economical, more efficient and more user friendly by implementing improvements in technology. E-filing is still underway as a pilot project in the Supreme

Court; in addition, several Illinois counties are participating in pilot projects that allow attorneys, parties and appellate justices to electronically view, access and work from the official record of cases on appeal.

The Special E-Business Committee consulted with representatives from bar groups, appellate lawyers, circuit court clerks and members of the Illinois Judicial Conference. Along with Chair Bruce Pfaff, the Committee members are Sterling attorney Trent L. Bush; Chicago attorney David M. Hundley; Edwardsville attorney Rebecca R. Jackson; Chicago attorney Vanessa G. Jacobsen; Northbrook attorney Alan Pearlman; Wheaton attorneyEdward J. Walsh; and Springfield attorney Thomas H. Wilson.

Illinois Supreme Court Clerk Carolyn Taft Grosboll and Fourth District Appellate Court ClerkCarla Bender serve as ex-officio members of the Committee.

--
Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 


THIS MESSAGE AND ANY ATTACHMENTS MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL, PRIVILEGED, AND EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. ANY RECIPIENT OTHER THAN THE INTENDED RECIPIENT IS ADVISED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION, COPYING, OR OTHER USE OF THIS MESSAGE IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.

IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS MESSAGE IN ERROR, PLEASE NOTIFY THE SENDER IMMEDIATELY.

IRS CIRCULAR 230 NOTICE: To the extent that this message or any attachment concerns tax matters, it is not intended to be used and cannot be used by a taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties that may be imposed by law.

New Law regarding Health Expenses, Daycare, and Extra-Curricular Expenses

Up to this point, our firm has been very successful with our requests from McLean County courts for a division of child-related expenses, such as medical costs, daycare, and extra-curricular activities. While there has not been any explicit statute regarding these expenses in the past, there has been case law, from the Illinois Appellate Court, that we have used to assist the judges who want to divide these expenses. But now, the State Legislature has passed Public Act 097-0941. This law amends the Child Support section of the Divorce Statute (Section 505), and specifically states that a court can, in its own discretion, divide these expenses between the parties. While we have found that it was almost a given in every Bloomington divorce (or separation) that medical expenses are divided, a number of judges have, at times, expressed reluctance to split extra-curricular expenses, perhaps worried about over-stepping the proper reach of a court. After January 13th (the date this new law goes into effect), the amended statute gives a court discretion to allocate these expenses between the parties.  Allowing the courts this discretion will likely enhance the odds that a court will actually use such discretion to equitably allocate these expenses. If you have any questions about this new law, and how it could affect your situation or case, please contact our office at (309) 622-5084.  

--
Jon D. McLaughlin

(309) 319-6206 


THIS MESSAGE AND ANY ATTACHMENTS MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL, PRIVILEGED, AND EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. ANY RECIPIENT OTHER THAN THE INTENDED RECIPIENT IS ADVISED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION, COPYING, OR OTHER USE OF THIS MESSAGE IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.

IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS MESSAGE IN ERROR, PLEASE NOTIFY THE SENDER IMMEDIATELY.

IRS CIRCULAR 230 NOTICE: To the extent that this message or any attachment concerns tax matters, it is not intended to be used and cannot be used by a taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties that may be imposed by law.

Associate Judge Notice of Vacancy

Bloomington Illinois: 

The Eleventh Judicial Circuit has approval from the IL Supreme Court to post the attached Associate Judge Notice of Vacancy. Applications are due by October 24, 2012