Friday, August 23, 2013

Removal of Your Children from Bloomington Illinois after your Divorce: Possible New Statute

The talk around Bloomington-Normal right now is about the possible State Farm transfers. Many folks at State Farm are divorce and have minor children here in McLean County. Just because State Farm tells you to move does not mean you will be able to take your children with you. You must typically file a Petition to Remove with the Court.

Removal, in the past, has been if you want to leave the State of Illinois. Part of the bill that the State Legislature is due to vote on this Fall modifies things a bit. Removal is replaced with "relocation," and instead of out-of-state moves, 25-mile moves are covered. This seems drastic, and I hope there is some healthy debate in the legislature before this is voted on.

If you have any questions about removal or relocation, call our firm for a free initial consultation or visit us on the web at www.BloomingtonLawGroup.com


Here would be the new definition of relocation:

"Relocation" means a change of residence of more than 25 miles for more than 90 days that significantly impairs a parent's ability to exercise the parental responsibilities that the parent has been exercising or is entitled to exercise under a parenting plan or allocation judgment.



Here is the language of the proposed new statute:

(a) A parent's relocation constitutes a substantial change in circumstances for purposes of Section 610.5.

(b) Only a parent who has been allocated a majority of parenting time may seek to relocate with a child, except that when parents have equal parenting time, either parent may seek to relocate with a child.

(c) Any parent intending to relocate must provide at least 60 days prior written notice to any other parent under the parenting plan or allocation judgment unless such notice is impracticable (in which case written notice shall be given at the earliest date practicable) or unless otherwise ordered by the court. At a minimum, the notice must set forth the following:

(1) the intended date of the parent's relocation;

(2) the address of the parent's intended new residence, if known;

(3) the specific reasons for the parent's intended relocation;

(4) a proposal modifying the parents' parental responsibilities, if necessary, in light of the relocation; and

(5) if the parent's intended relocation requires a change in the child's school, a statement of how the relocating parent intends to meet the child's educational needs.


The court may consider a parent's failure to comply with the notice requirements of this Section without good cause (i) as a factor in determining whether the parent's relocation is in good faith; and (ii) as a basis for awarding reasonable attorney's fees and costs resulting from the parent's failure to comply with these provisions.


(d) If a parent receives a written notice of the other parent's intent to relocate and objects to the relocation, then no later than 30 days after receiving the notice, the objecting parent must file a petition setting forth objections to the proposed relocation. A petition filed under this subsection shall be expeditiously heard by the court. A parent's failure to file for the relief provided under this subsection constitutes a waiver of that parent's objections to the relocation. If the court finds that objections are made in bad faith, it shall award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to the other party.

(e) The court shall modify the parenting plan or allocation judgment to accommodate a parent's relocation as agreed by the parents, as long as the agreed modification is in the child's best interests.

(f) The court shall modify the parenting plan or allocation judgment to accommodate the relocation without changing the proportion of parental responsibilities between the parties, if practicable, as long as such a modification is in the child's best interests.

(g) If a parent's relocation makes it impracticable to maintain the same proportion of parental responsibilities between the parties, the court shall modify the parenting plan or allocation judgment in accordance with the child's best interests. The court shall consider the following factors:

(1) the factors set forth in subsection (c) of this Section;

(2) the reasons, if any, why a parent is objecting to the intended relocation;

(3) the history and quality of each parent's relationship with the child since the implementation of any previous parenting plan or allocation judgment;

(4) the educational opportunities for the child at the existing location and at the proposed new location;

(5) the presence or absence of extended family at the existing location and at the proposed new location;

(6) the anticipated impact of the relocation on the child;

(7) whether the court will be able to fashion a reasonable allocation of parental responsibilities between all parents if the relocation occurs;

(8) the wishes of the child after taking into consideration the child's age and maturity;

(9) whether the intended relocation is valid, in good faith, and to a location that is reasonable in light of the purpose;

(10) possible arrangements for the exercise of parental responsibilities appropriate to the parents' resources and circumstances and the developmental level of the child.

(11) minimization of the impairment to a parent-child relationship caused by a parent's relocation; and

(12) any other relevant factors bearing on the child's best interests.

(h) Unless the non-relocating parent demonstrates that a reallocation of parental responsibilities is necessary to prevent harm to the child, the court shall deny the non-relocating parent's request for a reallocation of parental responsibilities based on relocation if the non-relocating parent either:

(1) failed to object to the relocation within the time allowed; or

(2) has substantially failed or refused to exercise the parental responsibilities allocated to him or her under the parenting plan or allocation judgment.




Best Regards, 

Jon D. McLaughlin
Bloomington Law Group LLC
Flanagan State Bank Building
2401 East Washington Street
Bloomington Illinois 61704
Skype: jmclaug2


THIS MESSAGE AND ANY ATTACHMENTS MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL, PRIVILEGED, AND EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. ANY RECIPIENT OTHER THAN THE INTENDED RECIPIENT IS ADVISED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION, COPYING, OR OTHER USE OF THIS MESSAGE IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.

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In re Marriage of Wendt

Bonus money comes up a lot in the divorces we handle in Bloomington Illinois. This recent case may affect future cases in McLean County Divorces.


In dissolution proceeding, court properly found that husband's bonus from his employer was not marital property. Bonus was speculative until actually awarded by the employer, and was not a contractually enforceable right, as it was issued at employer's discretion.


Best Regards, 

Jon D. McLaughlin
Bloomington Law Group LLC
Flanagan State Bank Building
2401 East Washington Street
Bloomington Illinois 61704
Skype: jmclaug2



Thursday, August 15, 2013

Retroactive Child Support Article published by the Illinois State Bar Association

Child LawThe newsletter of the ISBA's Section on Child Law

August 2013, vol. 26, no. 1

Retroactivity of child support

By 
Jon D. McLaughlin

It is very common to hear an attorney state that child support can be awarded retroactive to the date of filing a petition asking for support, but is this an accurate summation of the law? It most certainly is not. And, quite to the contrary, there are many avenues that can lead to a retroactive award of child support. This article will attempt to present a brief glimpse of a few situations that would allow a retroactive award.

Parentage Cases

The Parentage Act states that "the Court may order any child support payments to be made for a period prior to the commencement of the action." 750 ILCS 45/14(b) (requiring that support be ordered back at least as far as the service of summons). The court has consistently held that an award of retroactive child support is perfectly reasonable, and has extended children's rights to such awards to apply from date of birth to beyond the date of maturity. Janssen v. Turner292 Ill.App.3d 219 (4th District, 1997); People ex rel. Greene v. Young367 Ill.App.3d 211 (4th Dist 2006). In addition, when considering retroactive child support to children's birth, 750 ILCS 45/14(b) further specifies that there is a rebuttable presumption that the father's current net income at the time of the order is the same as his prior net income, and the Court should follow this standard.

Divorce Cases

When the original Judgment of Dissolution is silent on the matter of child support, a subsequent child support award may provide for retroactive support. See Gill v. Gill56 Ill.2d 139 (1973) (where the original proceedings were in rem, the divorce decree reserved jurisdiction to order support, and the court later acquired personal jurisdiction over the payor); In re Marriage of Cuberly135 Ill.App.3d 55 (5th Dist. 1985) (where the original proceedings were in rem, the divorce decree was completely silent on the issue of child support, and the court later acquired personal jurisdiction over the payor); cf. Nerini v. Nerini140 Ill.App.3d 848 (2nd Dist. 1986) (retroactive or "equitable" support not allowed where there was personal jurisdiction in the original proceedings, and the court expressly retained jurisdiction over the issue of child support); Conner v. Watkins, 158 Ill.App.3d 759 (4th Dist. 1987). When a court is able to make a retroactive award, once personal jurisdiction of the payor is acquired, there is a rebuttable presumption about his income:

(4.5) In a proceeding for child support following dissolution of the marriage by a court that lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, and in which the court is requiring payment of support for the period before the date an order for current support is entered, there is a rebuttable presumption that the supporting party's net income for the prior period was the same as his or her net income at the time the order for current support is entered.

750 ILCS 5/505/(a)(4.5); see also 750 ILCS 20/24(3) (governing retroactive awards and presumptions of income under the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act).

In a final decree of divorce, a court may provide for a retroactive child support award in order to make up the difference between what temporary support was paid and what temporary support should have been pursuant to the statutory guidelines. In re Marriage of Toole273 Ill.App.3d 607 (2nd Dist. 1995) (ordering a retroactive amount of $22,000, as being the difference of the statutory guideline amount and the amount that was paid on a temporary basis).

When There is a Duty to Report Income

The public policy that child-support obligors support their children in accordance with their ability to pay, is supported by the requirement, found in several statutes, for obligors to report changes in their employment and/or income. e.g., 750 ILCS 16/1 et seq.; 750 ILCS 45/1 et seq.; 750 ILCS 28/45. In fact, the failure to report such changes can be the basis for contempt. See 750 ILCS 16/20(f); 750 ILCS 45/15. Courts have made child support modifications retroactive for the reason that the obligors failed to report employment changes. See People ex rel. Greene v. Young367 Ill.App.3d 211 (4th Dist. 2006) ("our decision is based on our conclusion that it would be 'absurd to believe the legislature intended to permit someone such as [Robert] to disregard direct court orders and thereby to escape his' duty to support his child."); People ex rel. Williams v. Williams191 Ill.App.3d 311 (4th Dist. 1989). The Greene court stated:

We find it important that it was not Candice's responsibility to continuously bring Robert into court to check on his employment status. To require her to do so would have been inconvenient, expensive, and waste of judicial resources....Both Illinois' public policy and the May 1988 order put the onus on Robert to report a change in his employment status so that he would be required to support his child. Candice alleged Robert failed to report the change in his employment status upon gaining employment. If true, Robert directly disregarded the court's May 1988 order and violated the public policy of this state. We conclude that under these circumstances, a 'circuit court is not statutorily barred from imposing a retroactive child[-]support obligation upon a respondent in an ongoing child[-]support proceeding who, contrary to the court's directive, has failed to inform the court of his having resumed employment.'...We recognize that under normal circumstances '[s]upport may be modified only as to installments accruing after the nonmoving party has been notified that a motion to modify has been filed and only upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances' [citation omitted]. However, the facts of this case are extraordinary. As stated, a circuit court may impose a retroactive child-support obligation upon a respondent in an ongoing child-support proceeding when a respondent has failed to inform the court of his having resumed employment as required by court order.

Greene v. Young367 Ill.App.3d 211 (4th Dist. 2006) (quoting Williams, 191 Ill.App.3d at 317; In re Marriage of Zukausky244 Ill.App.3d 614 (2nd Dist. 1993)).

Conclusion

As with a lot of other issues in the law, the possibility of a retroactive child support award is not something that can be summed up in a quick sentence or two, nonchalantly delivered to clients. On the contrary, the correct answer is a quick "maybe," followed up by one question after another question, in an effort to get down the particular facts of the matter so that you can give the client an accurate answer. Hopefully, this short article was able to point out some of the circumstances that should raise red flags when speaking with clients. ■




Best Regards, 

Jon D. McLaughlin
Bloomington Law Group LLC
Flanagan State Bank Building
2401 East Washington Street
Bloomington Illinois 61704
Skype: jmclaug2


THIS MESSAGE AND ANY ATTACHMENTS MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL, PRIVILEGED, AND EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. ANY RECIPIENT OTHER THAN THE INTENDED RECIPIENT IS ADVISED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION, COPYING, OR OTHER USE OF THIS MESSAGE IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.

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Saturday, August 10, 2013

No More Alienation of Affection Lawsuits in McLean County (New IMDMA, Pt. 1)

If House Bill 1452 turns into law, it will abolish law suits know as alienation of affection lawsuits in Bloomington Illinois. The main idea behind these suits is that if it were not for a third-party coming along and seducing the spouse away from the other spouse, the marriage would have gone on in bliss. These lawsuits are very difficult to win, and are seldom brought. Below is the explanatory language in the Bill that discusses alienation of affection and the changes that will be made. If you have any questions about divorce or family law issues in Bloomington Illinois, contact Bloomington Law Group LLC at 309-319-6206.

    1. The majority of states have abolished heart balm actions. In Illinois, heart balm actions for alienation of affections, breach of promise to marry, and criminal conversation were permitted under the common law before the abolition of those causes of action by "An Act in relation to certain causes of action conducive to extortion and  blackmail, and to declare illegal, contracts and Acts made and done in pursuance thereof", filed May 4, 1935, Laws 1935, p. 716. The Illinois Supreme Court held, in Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296 (1946), that the 1935 Act was unconstitutional and that the abolition of heart balm actions would infringe upon the rights of parties to remedies under Section 19 of Article II of the 1870 Constitution. (Section 12 of Article I of the 1970 Constitution is similar to the relevant portion of Section 19 of Article II of the 1870 Constitution.) Since 1947, heart balm actions have been permitted with limited damages under the Alienation of Affections Act, the Breach of Promise Act, and the Criminal Conversation Act.

    2.  Society has since recognized that the amicable settlement of domestic relations disputes is beneficial. In 1977, the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act became the law of this State. As stated in Section 102 of that Act, among its underlying purposes are: promoting the amicable settlement of disputes that have arisen between parties to a marriage; mitigating the potential harm to the spouses and their children caused by the process of legal dissolution of marriage; and eliminating the consideration of marital misconduct in the adjudication of rights and duties incident to the legal dissolution of marriage, legal separation and declaration of invalidity of marriage. Heart balm actions are inconsistent with these purposes. Society has also realized that women and men should have equal rights under the law. Heart balm actions are rooted in the now-discredited notion that men and women are unequal. Although the Alienation of Affections Act, the Breach of Promise Act, and the Criminal Conversation Act represent attempts to ameliorate some of the more odious consequences of heart balm actions, the General Assembly finds that actions for alienation of affections, breach of promise to marry, and criminal conversation are contrary to the public policy of this State and those causes of action should be abolished. 




Best Regards, 

Jon D. McLaughlin
Bloomington Law Group LLC
Flanagan State Bank Building
2401 East Washington Street
Bloomington Illinois 61704
Skype: jmclaug2



Big Changes possibly coming for Bloomington Illinois Divorces

Divorces in McLean County are governed, in large part, by the IMDMA (Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act). There have been plans on the drawing board to revise the IMDMA for some time, but a vote may come this Fall to make some major changes. I will be publishing a number of blog posts on McLeanCountyDivorce.blogspot.com over the next couple of months about these changes that could affect my divorce practice in Bloomington Illinois. This first post is simply an article that I was sent by the State Bar. If you have any questions about these changes and how they will affect your Central Illinois divorce or family case, just contact my office at Office@BloomingtonLawGroup.com 


Terminology. Courts will no longer award custody or visitation under this bill. Rather, courts will allocate parental responsibilities to include parenting time. A parent may ask the court for permission to relocate with a minor child instead of removing the child. Interestingly, it continues to use the lawyerism dissolution of marriage. Have any of you ever heard this process referred to as anything other than a divorce?

Grounds. House Bill 1452 includes only one ground for dissolution—that irreconcilable differences have caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, and that efforts at reconciliation have failed or that future attempts at reconciliation would be impracticable and not in the best interests of the family.[1] The current six-month waiting period for this ground is repealed, but if the parties are separated for six months it creates an irrefutable presumption that irreconcilable differences exist.[2]

Presumption of residential parenting time. House Bill 1452 creates a rebuttable presumption in every case that it is in the best interest of a child that each parent should be allocated not less than 35% residential parenting time.[3] A court does have authority to restrict parental responsibilities to protect a child's mental, moral, or physical, or emotional health.[4]

Allocation of parental responsibilities. House Bill 1452 requires the court to presume that it is in the child's best interests to allocate significant decision-making responsibilities to each parent if each parent had been exercising significant decision-making responsibilities for the child (1) over the prior 24 months preceding the filing of the petition or (2) since the child's birth if the child is under the age of two.[5]

Parenting Plan. All parents, within 90 days after service or filing of a petition for allocation of parental responsibilities, must file with the court a separate or joint proposed parenting plan supported by an affidavit or affidavits.[6]If the court doesn't approve a joint parenting plan, it must make express findings justifying its refusal to do so. If the parties can't agree on a joint plan, they must submit separate plans. A rebuttable presumption is created that the child's best interests are served by awarding a time-sharing arrangement consisting of an allocation of not less than 35% residential time for each parent. A parenting plan must contain at a minimum information meeting 14 statutory criteria.[7] If the court is forced to choose between the separate parenting plans, it must select the plan that maximizes the child's relationship and access to both parents. The court retains discretion to determine exceptions to this directive if warranted by individual facts and circumstances but must provide written findings of fact and conclusions of law when making such exceptions.[8]

Delays in judgments. House Bill 1452 makes two changes for how judgments are handled. (1) Requires the court to enter a judgment at the conclusion of the case. It prohibits it from being entered after hearing the testimony on the grounds only.[9] (2) Requires the court to enter a judgment of dissolution of marriage within 60 days of the closing of proofs unless the court enters an order specifying good cause that gives it an additional 30 days.[10]

Child support. The only change made here is substitution of the term supporting parent fornon-custodial parent. The supporting parent is the parent with the majority of residential responsibility of the child.[11]

Joint petition for simplified dissolution. It changes the criteria for filing a joint petition for simplified dissolution as follows:[12]

  • Neither party may have an interest in "retirement benefits."
  • The total FMV of all marital property, after deduction of encumbrances, is less than $50k.
  • The combined gross annualized income from all sources is less than $60k.
  • Neither party has a gross annualized income from all sources in excess of $30k.

Marital settlement agreements. A § 502 marital settlement agreement, which may include educational expenses, must be in writing or it's not valid.[13] The terms of an agreement incorporated into a judgment trump any conflict between its terms and prove-up testimony.[14] Concerning modification of an agreement, property provisions are never modifiable; child support, parental responsibilities, maintenance, and educational expenses are modifiable on a substantial change of circumstances. The parties may agree that maintenance is non-modifiable in amount, duration, or both.[15]

Property. Among the many changes made to § 503 on division of property and debts, two will be noted here. (1) Requires the party alleging that something isn't marital property to prove it by clear and convincing evidence.[16] (2) If the court doesn't divide the property on a 50% basis, it must make specific findings of fact as why it deviated from that directive.[17]

Maintenance. Among the many changes to § 504 on maintenance, three will be noted here. (1) If House Bill 1452 is enacted, an order for unallocated maintenance and child support may not be entered.[18] This doesn't affect previously entered unallocated orders. (2) The court may secure a maintenance award by requiring the payor to buy an appropriate amount of life insurance and name the recipient spouse as the beneficiary.[19] (3) If the court changes an order of maintenance, House Bill 1452 requires the court to make a record of the specific factual findings that support this change.[20]

Educational expenses. Among § 513's changes are the following:

  • Educational expenses under this Section must be incurred no later than the student's 23rd birthday unless otherwise agreed to by the parties.
  • Caps the expenses for tuition, fees, housing, and meals to what is charged at the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana. This cap doesn't include other expenses such as medical expenses and other reasonable living expenses.
  • Support under this Section ends when the student fails to maintain a "C" average (unless illness or otherwise extenuating circumstances), becomes 23 years of age or older, receives a bachelor's degree, or marries. It doesn't terminate the court's authority under this Section if the child joins the military, becomes pregnant, or is incarcerated.
  • Children are not third-party beneficiaries and not entitled to file a petition for contribution.
  • Relief under § 513 is retroactive to the date of filing of the petition.

Non-minor disabled child. A new section (§ 513.5) is created for the support of a non-minor disabled child. The definition of disabled is borrowed from the Americans with Disabilities Act. Unless an application is made for § 513 support for a disabled child, the disability must have arisen before the child attained majority.

Modification. The general rule is that a court is required to modify a parenting plan or allocation judgment if necessary to serve the child's best interests if the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence:

  • a substantial change of circumstances has occurred with the child or of any parent caused by facts that have arisen since the entry of the existing parenting plan or allocation judgment or were not anticipated in the plan or judgment; or
  • the existing allocation of parental responsibilities seriously endangers the child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.[21]

The court may modify a parenting plan or allocation judgment without a showing of changed circumstances if it is in the child's best interests and any of the following circumstances occur:

  • The modification is minor.
  • The modification reflects the actual arrangement under which the child has been living (without parental objection) for the six months preceding the filing of the petition for modification.
  • The modification is necessary to modify an agreed parenting plan or allocation judgment that the court would not have approved or ordered if the court had been aware of the circumstances at the time of the order or approval.

Relocation. Relocation is a substantial change of circumstances for modifying a judgment.[22] Relocation is defined as "a change of residence of more than 25 miles for more than 90 days that significantly impairs a parent's ability to exercise the parental responsibilities that the parent has been exercising or is entitled to exercise under a parenting plan or allocation judgment."[23] Only a parent who has been allocated a majority parenting time may seek to relocate with a child, except that when parents have equal parenting time, either parent may seek to relocate with a child. House Bill 1452 provides a procedure for notice and objection of intent to relocate.

Effective date. House Bill 1452 has no stated effective date; therefore, if it is passed in veto session, it probably will become law on June 1, 2014. It would then apply to these proceedings commenced on or after July 1, 2014: new proceedings, all pending actions, and all proceedings in which modification is sought of a judgment or order entered before July 1, 2014.[24]





Jon D. McLaughlin
Bloomington Law Group LLC
Flanagan State Bank Building
2401 East Washington Street
Bloomington Illinois 61704
Skype: jmclaug2



Wednesday, August 7, 2013

Something for Sperm Donors in Bloomington Illinois to Keep on the Radar

Kansas demands that sperm donor pay child support

By NBC staff and wire services
August 7, 2013, 7:25 pm
NBCNews.com

A Kansas man who donated sperm to a lesbian couple three years ago is fighting the state's demand that he pay child support.

The two women raising the 3-year-old girl say they support the man, who responded to an ad they posted on the Craigslist website in 2009, the Topeka Capital-Journal reported.

The issue of child support arose when the two women broke up, and the couple applied for state services. Workers at the Kansas Department for Children and Families demanded the donor's name and then filed a child-support claim against him, the newspaper said.

Angela Bauer, one of the mothers, told the Capital-Journal that she and her former partner, Jennifer Schreiner, support the donor, William Marotta, "in whatever action he wants to go forward with" to fight the state's demand.

"This was a wonderful opportunity with a guy with an admirable, giving character who wanted nothing more than to help us have a child," the newspaper quoted Bauer, 40, as saying. "I feel like the state of Kansas has made a mess out of the situation."

When Bauer and Schreiner, the 34-year-old birth mother, reached a deal with Marotta that did not include any payment for his sperm donation, he signed a written agreement that relinquished all parental rights and held him harmless "for any child support payments demanded of him by any other person or entity, public or private ... regardless of the circumstances or said demand," it said.

The state argued in court papers that because the insemination wasn't performed by a licensed physician, the contract was null and void.

When the two women split in 2010, they had eight children, including some they adopted, whom they now co-parent.

Marotta, a 43-year-old mechanic, was dragged into the dispute when the couple filed for state assistance. The state insisted that they reveal the donor's identity, saying that if they refused to do so, their daughter would no longer be eligible for health care coverage. The women reluctantly complied, the Capital-Journal reported.

The girl's birth certificate does not include her biological father's name, and the Capital-Journal said that he had no contact with the girl, other than receiving occasional email updates from Bauer. Both women adopted the girl, although they had to file for adoption separately because the state does not recognize same-sex unions, the newspaper said. This means that the state also cannot collect child support from same-sex parents.

"More and more gays and lesbians are adopting and reproducing, and this, to me, is a step backward," said Bauer, who formerly supported the family financially but is no longer able to work due to a "serious illness." "I think a lot of progressive movement is happening currently in the world as far as gays and

Page 1 of 3 Aug 07, 2013 08:26:16PM MDT

http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/12/30/16254404-kansas-demands-that-sperm-donor-pay-child-support?lite

lesbians go. Maybe this is Kansas' stand against some of that."

The Capital-Journal could not reach Marotta for comment and the Kansas Department for Children and Families declined to discuss the case, citing privacy laws.

This isn't the first time states have demanded child support from sperm donors. But in most of those cases, the sperm donor was known to the birth family – usually a man who was friendly with a lesbian couple and who agreed to help them out.

Court rulings vary

Sperm donors who donate through a sperm bank are typically protected by state parenting shield laws. But in less straight-forward cases, courts have differed on whether the men should pay up.

A Massachusetts court ruled this year that a Nigerian immigrant had to pay child support for twins conceived through artificial insemination a year after he and his wife had separated, the Patriot Ledger reported.

And In Vermont, a man who donated sperm to a female friend was required to pay child support because he maintained a relationship with the children.

Explained one of the mothers to The Associated Press in 2007: "Part of the decision came down because he was so involved with them. It wasn't that he went to the (sperm) bank and that was it. They called him Papa."

In New York, a married doctor agreed to donate sperm to a young resident and her partner in the late 1980s, only to be asked 18 years later for child support, the New York Post reported.

His undoing was sending money and cards to the child, which he would sign, "Dad" or "Daddy." The biological father's name was also on the birth certificate.

But in Washington state, the Court of Appeals ruled in 2004 that a donor can't be required to pay child support unless he and the mother have signed an explicit contract.

And in Texas, an appeals court ruled in favor of a former policeman who donated sperm to a woman he had been formerly connected with. He had paid thousands of dollars in child support for twins until the court ruled in his favor.

When the lawsuit was filed in 2008, the man told McClatchy: "I was totally blown away. I was already married and had moved on with my life."

NBC's Isolde Raftery and The Associated Press contributed reporting.





Best Regards, 

Jon D. McLaughlin
Bloomington Law Group LLC
Flanagan State Bank Building
2401 East Washington Street
Bloomington Illinois 61704
Skype: jmclaug2


THIS MESSAGE AND ANY ATTACHMENTS MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL, PRIVILEGED, AND EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. ANY RECIPIENT OTHER THAN THE INTENDED RECIPIENT IS ADVISED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION, COPYING, OR OTHER USE OF THIS MESSAGE IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.

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